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BELIEF STATES IN CRIMINAL LAW – DRAFT 
JAMES A. MACLEOD* 
Belief-state ascription—determining what someone “knew,” “believed,” 
was “aware of,” etc.—is central to many areas of law.  In criminal law, the 
distinction between knowledge and recklessness, and the use of broad jury 
instructions concerning other belief states, presupposes a common and 
stable understanding of what those belief-state terms mean.  But a wealth of 
empirical work at the intersection of philosophy and psychology—falling 
under the banner of “Experimental Epistemology”—reveals how 
laypeople’s understandings of mens rea concepts differ systematically from 
what scholars, courts, and perhaps legislators, have assumed.  
 As implemented, mens rea concepts are much more context-dependent 
and normatively evaluative than the conventional wisdom suggests, even 
assuming that jurors are following jury instructions to the letter.  As a 
result, there is less difference between knowledge and recklessness than is 
typically assumed; jurors consistently “over”-ascribe knowledge to 
criminal defendants; and concepts like “belief,” “awareness,” and 
“conscious disregard” mean different things in different contexts, resulting 
in mens rea findings systematically responsive to aspects of the case 
traditionally considered irrelevant to the meaning of those terms.   
This Article provides the first systematic account of the factors driving 
jurors’ ascriptions of the specific belief states criminal law invokes.  After 
surveying mens rea jury instructions, introducing the Experimental 
Epistemology literature to the legal literature on mens rea, and examining 
the implications of that literature for criminal law, this Article considers 
ways to begin bridging the surprisingly large gap between mens rea theory 
and practice. 
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I. Introduction 
The law often requires fact-finders to use circumstantial evidence to 
determine another’s mental state.  These mental states fall into two basic 
categories: desire states (such as intent, purpose, and indifference) and 
belief states (such as knowledge, belief, and ignorance).1  Legal scholarship 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 476 (1992) 
[hereinafter Simons, Rethinking].  The “desire states” label is a bit of a misnomer: one can 
intend to do something without desiring to do it, for example, as happens when one is forced 
to choose between courses of action one dislikes.  Still, the label is prevalent in the legal 
literature and suffices for present purposes. 
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has examined how laypeople ascribe desire states,2 but it has largely 
ignored how fact-finders ascribe belief states.  This gap in the legal 
literature is surprising given the central role belief-state ascription plays in 
fact-finding throughout the law. 
Consider substantive criminal law.  A defendant’s guilt or innocence, 
along with his degree of punishment, frequently turns on his belief state—
whether he was “aware” of something, “believed” something, “consciously 
disregarded” something, “knew” something, etc.  The definitions of all four 
of the Model Penal Code’s (MPC) mens rea categories—purpose, 
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence—explicitly invoke the defendant’s 
belief state, as do hundreds of provisions throughout federal and state 
criminal codes.3  And a defendant’s punishment differs significantly 
depending on whether, for example, the defendant was “aware” of a risk 
(and hence was reckless, rather than negligent),4 or whether the defendant 
                                                                                                                 
 2. E.g., Pam A. Mueller et al., When Does Knowledge Become Intent? Perceiving the 
Minds of Wrongdoers, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 859 (2012); Janice Nadler & Mary-
Hunter McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive, and the Psychology of Blame, 97 CORNELL L. 
REV. 255 (2012); Julia Kobick, Discriminatory Intent Reconsidered: Folk Concepts of 
Intentionality and Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 517 (2010); 
Julia Kobick & Joshua Knobe, How Research on Folk Judgments of Intentionality Can 
Inform Statutory Analysis, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 409 (2009); Lawrence M. Solan, Blame, 
Praise, and the Structure of Legal Rules, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 517 (2009); Thomas 
Nadelhoffer, Bad Acts, Blameworthy Agents, and Intentional Actions: Some Problems for 
Juror Impartiality, 9 PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATIONS 203 (2006); Bertram F. Malle & Sarah 
E. Nelson, Judging Mens Rea: The Tension Between Folk Concepts and Legal Concepts of 
Intentionality, 21 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 563 (2003). 
 3. E.g., sources cited infra notes 12, 24, 45-56.  Moreover, some recent legislative 
proposals, as well as criminal law scholarship, advocate a mens rea schema with yet greater 
emphasis on belief states such as awareness of wrongdoing.  E.g., H.R. 4002, proposed Nov. 
16, 2015 (proposed “Criminal Code Improvement Act of 2015” would add to federal 
criminal provisions a requirement that, “if the offense consists of conduct that a reasonable 
person in the same or similar circumstances would not know, or would not have reason to 
believe, was unlawful, the Government must prove that the defendant knew, or had reason to 
believe, the conduct was unlawful.”); Gideon Yaffe, A Republican Crime Proposal That 
Democrats Should Back, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2016 (supporting passage of the Criminal 
Code Improvement Act of 2015); Samuel W. Buell, Culpability and Modern Crime, 103 
GEO. L.J. 547 (2015); see also Douglas Husak, “Broad” Culpability and the Retributivist 
Dream, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 449, 480-84 (2012).  
 4. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) [hereinafter MPC]; 
Douglas Husak, Negligence, Belief, Blame and Criminal Liability: The Special Case of 
Forgetting, 5 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 199, 207 (2011) (“It is scandalous that the scholarly debate 
about the justifiability of penal liability for negligence has not made greater efforts to 
understand the nature of awareness.”). 
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was not merely “aware” of a risk but actually “knew” that a bad outcome 
would result from his action.5 
Despite the central role these and other belief-state terms play in law,6 a 
fundamental question remains unanswered: what do they mean?  More 
specifically, when the criminal law asks jurors to determine whether a 
defendant “knew” something, “believed” something, “consciously 
disregarded” something, etc., and when jurors faithfully implement the 
instructions they are given, what functional understanding of those belief-
state terms are they employing?   
This Article is the first sustained attempt at answering that question.  
Previous accounts of modern mens rea concepts have too often glossed over 
it, relying on supposedly commonly shared intuitions about the meaning of 
the terms at issue,7 philosophical analyses of the relevant terms,8 or 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text. 
 6. Belief states are central to many more issues, in criminal law and elsewhere, than 
are apparent at first glance.  For example, sticking with criminal law, even where the 
pertinent statute calls for desire-state ascription and does not explicitly call for belief-state 
ascription, courts sometimes explicitly instruct that a belief state satisfies the desire-state 
requirement—e.g., if the jury finds that the defendant possessed knowledge that his action 
would cause a given outcome, this may suffice for a finding that the defendant intentionally 
caused that outcome.  See, e.g., Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1248-49 
(2014).  And even where courts do not so instruct, recent empirical research indicates that a 
jury’s intentionality ascription will likely track its knowledge ascription.  In other words, 
with or without an instruction from the court, the jury will typically deem knowledge 
sufficient for intent.  See Mueller, supra note 2, at 860; infra Section III.A.1.  Nor does 
belief-state ascription merely influence ascription of other mental states.  The conclusions 
that fact-finders make about a person’s belief state sometimes also impact fact-finders’ 
determination of an act or omission’s degree of causal influence—i.e., degree to which the 
act or omission caused a particular outcome—an attribute traditionally thought not to 
implicate mental state ascription.  See Christopher Hitchcock & Joshua Knobe, Cause and 
Norm, 106 J. PHIL. 587, 602-05 (2009); Nadler & McDonnell, supra note 2, at 287; Briar 
Helen Moir, Judgments in Causal Chains: The Impact of Positive and Negative Motives and 
Outcomes on Lay Attributions (2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Victoria University 
of Wellington), http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10063/3277/thesis. 
pdf?sequence=2 (reviewing the literature).  In sum, a growing body of legal doctrine and 
empirical literature places belief states at the center of many more legal issues than had 
previously seemed to be the case. 
 7. See e.g., Eric A. Johnson, Knowledge, Risk, and Wrongdoing: The Model Penal 
Code's Forgotten Answer to the Riddle of Objective Probability, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 507, 513 
(2011) (“There is a difference, of course, between what the actor knew and what she 
believed; in order to qualify as knowledge, a belief must be (at the very least) true and 
justified.”); Anthony M. Dillof, Transferred Intent: An Inquiry into the Nature of Criminal 
Culpability, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 501, 529 (1998) (arguing that an expert shooter A, who 
aims for B and is justified in believing he has shot and killed B, but who, it turns out, 
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appellate case law, statutory structure, official code commentaries, and 
other sources to which jurors are not privy.9  In contrast, this Article’s 
method is to examine actual mens rea jury instructions, and then, to the 
extent they leave relevant issues ambiguous, to draw on empirical research 
concerning how laypeople are likely to resolve those ambiguities.10   
                                                                                                                 
actually shot and killed C, did not “know he has killed someone” because “[i]ntuitively, we 
would say” that he does not know that he has killed someone); Kenneth W. Simons, Should 
the Model Penal Code’s Mens Rea Provisions Be Amended?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 179, 
187 (2003) [hereinafter Simons, Should the Model] (“[I]f ‘high probability’ is greater than 
50%, then the definition [of willful blindness, found in MPC § 2.02(7)] as a whole appears 
to be incoherent,” because you cannot “actually believe that a fact does not exist, when you 
know that more likely than not, it does exist”); David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO. 
L.J. 957, 961 (1999) (“[K]knowledge does require belief—I can hardly be said to know 
something if I don’t even believe it”); Christopher Slobogin, A Rational Approach to 
Responsibility, 83 MICH. L. REV. 820, 836 (1985) (reviewing MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND 
PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP (1989)) (distinguishing between knowledge of 
the consequences of one’s actions and “practical[] certain[ty]“ regarding those 
consequences); United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (“[I]n 
common understanding one ‘knows’ facts of which he is less than absolutely certain.  To act 
‘knowingly,’ therefore, is not necessarily to act only with positive knowledge . . . .”); United 
States v. Golomb, 811 F.2d 787, 792 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Knowledge and belief are very 
different mental states; knowledge implies a much higher degree of certainty.”); Cheek v. 
United States, 498 U.S. 192, 207-08 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is quite impossible to 
say that a statute which one believes unconstitutional represents a ‘known legal duty.’”). 
 8. See, e.g., Douglas N. Husak & Craig A. Callender, Wilful Ignorance, Knowledge, 
and the "Equal Culpability" Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the Principle of 
Legality, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 29, 47 n.72, 51 (using “conceptual analysis,” “retain[ing] the 
common opinion that” knowledge requires true belief that is justified, and concluding that 
“[s]ome kind of justificatory condition is necessary for both the legal and philosophical 
senses of knowledge”); Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance as a 
Criminal Mens Rea, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191, 220-27 (1990) (“Like the 
philosophical notion of knowledge, criminal knowledge requires certainty and a 
corresponding absence of doubt. . . .  Therefore, one ‘knows’ something only if he or she is 
certain of it.”). 
 9. See Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes of Indifference, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 105, 207-08 
(1996) (explaining that jury instructions have not “received the scholarly attention they 
deserve,” since “[s]cholarly analysis of mens rea usually focuses on the language of statutes, 
appellate decisions or the work of rival academics, not the standard jury instructions used by 
trial courts.”); infra Parts II, IV.E. 
 10. The previous failure to ask this sort of question about jurors is puzzling.  After all, 
scholars have offered rich accounts of how judges resolve ambiguous legal directives, both 
in general (e.g., general theories of adjudication like those espoused by legal realists and 
formalists), and more specifically (e.g., economic analyses of tort law doctrines or statutory 
interpretation).  Granted, jurors, unlike judges, leave no written explanation of their 
decision-making. But much of the judicial decision-making literature adopts an “external” 
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The results are surprising.  This Article uncovers important divergences 
between, on the one hand, what courts, commentators, and code drafters 
think belief-state terms do and should mean, and, on the other hand, what 
jurors are told that they mean.  The four main divergences can be 
summarized as follows.11  First, the distinction between knowledge and 
recklessness, as defined in popular jury instructions and applied in practice, 
is nearly nonexistent.  As a result, jurors likely “over”-ascribe knowledge to 
criminal defendants, and even where they do not, significant sentencing 
disparities hinge on an unreliable distinction.  Second, the legal concept of 
                                                                                                                 
perspective that seeks to explain judicial decision-making without recourse to the 
explanations judges themselves give.  See Charles L. Barzun, Inside-Out: Beyond the 
Internal/External Distinction in Legal Scholarship, 101 VA. L. REV. 1203, 1235-36 (2015).  
For speculation as to some reasons for the previous neglect, see infra Section IV.E. 
 11. Before summarizing them, it may help to provide a more concrete example of the 
sorts of ambiguities that pervade current mens rea jury instructions.  Consider the concept of 
“knowledge” at work in a recent Supreme Court case, Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 
1240 (2014). Rosemond’s partner brought a gun to a marijuana deal Rosemond helped 
orchestrate. Id. at 1243. At Rosemond’s trial for aiding and abetting an armed drug deal, the 
prosecution needed to prove that Rosemond “knew” in advance that his partner would show 
up armed, and that Rosemond “knowingly” participated in an armed drug deal. Id. at 1244, 
1250. Rosemond alleged he did not know his partner would be armed. Id. at 1246. (The 
aiding and abetting instructions in Rosemond, like many federal instructions, did not define 
knowledge, see Jury Instructions at 46, United States v. Rosemond, No. 2:07-CR-886 (D. 
Utah 2011); infra Section II.B, but even MPC-based definitions of knowledge leave open the 
ambiguities highlighted below, see infra Section II.A.) 
What might it mean to find that Rosemond “knew” that P, where “P” means “my partner 
will be armed”? First, and least controversially, for Rosemond to have “known” that P, P 
must have turned out to be true—i.e., Rosemond’s partner must actually bring a gun.  
Second, it seems likely that Rosemond must have believed that P.  But what sort of belief, if 
any, was necessary? Must Rosemond have had an “occurrent” belief (i.e., conscious 
consideration of P at the relevant time), or instead merely a “dispositional” belief (i.e., some 
sort of latent acknowledgment that P, such that Rosemond, if asked at the relevant time, 
would have agreed that P even though he hadn’t been thinking about it)?  And would it 
suffice for Rosemond to have in some sense intellectually acknowledged that P but yet act as 
if “deep down” he believed or accepted Not-P, perhaps due to “wishful thinking” or some 
other conative thought process?  Third, Rosemond might have to have some higher degree of 
subjective certainty about P than the mere belief that P is more likely true than Not-P.  If so, 
how much certainty must he have?  Eighty percent?  Ninety percent?  Finally, a few 
overarching questions:  does the degree of morality or immorality of the actor’s P-relevant 
action, in Rosemond’s case or in other cases, impact the type of belief that P, or the degree 
of certainty that P, that suffices for knowledge that P?  And can the requisite type of belief or 
degree of certainty depend on pragmatic features of the agent’s situation—for instance, how 
much time Rosemond had available to form an opinion about P?  For answers to these 
questions, see infra Section III.B.   
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“willful ignorance” is often a form of knowledge.  Where it is not, the two 
are distinguishable largely because of a difference in the actor’s practical 
circumstances, rather than a difference in the actor’s mental state.  Third, 
important concepts like “belief,” “awareness,” and “conscious disregard” 
signify different kinds of mental states in different circumstances.  As a 
result, jurors’ belief-state ascriptions systematically track features of the 
case typically thought irrelevant to mental-state determination, ultimately 
leading to mistaken convictions and acquittals.  Fourth, and more generally, 
modern mens rea terms are more context-dependent and evaluative than is 
typically thought.  This calls into question the conventional wisdom that 
modern criminal codes like the MPC employ less evaluative, and more 
purely descriptive, mens rea concepts than did the common law.  It also has 
important implications for various normative proposals premised on that 
conventional wisdom. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part II addresses how MPC and non-
MPC jurisdictions use and define belief state terms such as “knowledge,” 
“belief,” “conscious disregard,” and “failure to perceive.”  It focuses on 
actual belief-state jury instructions, as well as commentary from scholars, 
courts, and code drafters concerning the meaning of those belief-state 
terms.  It shows that jury instructions provide little explanation of belief 
states, leaving a large role for jurors’ pre-existing understandings of the 
terms in question.  Jurors interpret ambiguous directions in a way that 
coincides with their natural language-based understanding of the terms at 
issue.  What that understanding is, and how it is employed in response to 
circumstantial evidence of mental state, is an empirical question. 
Part III draws on recent empirical research at the intersection of 
philosophy and psychology—falling under the banner of “Experimental 
Epistemology”—to provide a descriptive account of how laypeople 
interpret and ascribe “belief,” “knowledge,” and related concepts.  This 
literature sheds light on how laypeople resolve the sorts of ambiguities 
noted in the previous Part’s discussion of common jury instructions. The 
resulting picture of the various mens rea terms differs in important respects 
from conventional legal and philosophical accounts of what those terms 
mean. 
Part IV examines the implications of the empirical research for the 
criminal law’s treatment of belief states.  It shows that several assumptions 
underlying courts’, commentators’, and perhaps legislatures’ mens rea 
analyses are flawed, resulting in misguided statutory schemes, misleading 
jury instructions, and unintended effects on case outcomes.  For each 
divergence between mens rea theory and practice this Part highlights, it also 
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explains why the divergence matters and discusses potential ways to 
address it.  After discussing the four main divergences listed above, Section 
IV.E considers several objections to the Article’s focus on jury instructions.  
It argues that these objections are unwarranted, and that scholarly scrutiny 
of mens rea jury instructions is particularly important because current 
institutional mechanisms are ill-designed to flag, let alone remedy, 
systematically problematic mens rea instructions. 
Part V concludes. 
II. Belief States in Criminal Law 
This Part examines what jurors are told about the legal definitions of 
belief states, as well as how legal scholars, legislators, model code drafters, 
and judges describe and interpret various belief-state terms.  It first 
addresses instructions in MPC jurisdictions and then more briefly examines 
federal instructions as a particularly important example of non-MPC mens 
rea analysis. 
A. The Model Penal Code 
The MPC employs four main mens rea categories, listed here in order of 
decreasing culpability: (1) purposely, (2) knowingly, (3) recklessly, and (4) 
negligently.12  Each entails a minimum requisite belief state, and each 
leaves open significant questions concerning what constitutes that belief 
                                                                                                                 
 12. MPC § 2.02(2).  Each state further up the culpability chain suffices to establish 
those lower on the chain.  Id. § 2.02(5).  The MPC adds a fifth mens rea in the context of 
homicide, labeled “extreme indifference.”  Id. § 210.2(1)(b).  Some specific crimes and 
affirmative defenses delineated in the MPC involve yet other mental states including, for 
example, “belief.”  See, e.g., id. § 3.04(2)(c) (“[A] person employing protective force may 
estimate the necessity thereof under the circumstances as he believes them to be when the 
force is used”); id. § 3.05(l)(b) (providing that use of force in defense of another person is to 
be evaluated on the basis of “the circumstances as the actor believes them to be”); id. § 
5.01(l)(c) (defining the elements of criminal attempt); id. § 223.6(1) (offense of receiving 
stolen property requires that one “purposely receives, retains, or disposes of movable 
property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has probably been 
stolen”); id. § 241.1 (perjury); id. § 3.02(1) (affirmative defense available where actor 
“believe[d]” conduct was necessary to avoid greater harm).  Non-MPC jurisdictions 
similarly utilize “belief” as a mental state distinct from knowledge, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 
1621(2) (2012) (perjury), and jurisdictions that typically follow the MPC at times invoke 
“belief” where the MPC does not, see, e.g., 27 MD. CODE ANN., Criminal Law § 7-101(b) 
(LexisNexis 2012) (deception); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.0(1)(A) (West Supp. 2014) 
(deception); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.72.110(2) (LexisNexis 2014) (intimidating former 
witnesses). 
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state.  Since “purposely” figures less centrally in the MPC,13 I focus on the 
other three MPC mental states and leave “purposely” for another day.14 
1. Knowingly 
MPC-based jury instructions concerning knowledge typically provide 
several definitions.  Knowledge of an inculpatory proposition, or 
knowledge that “P,”15 is defined as (1) “awareness” that P, or (2) 
“awareness that it is practically certain” that P, or (3) “awareness” of a 
“high probability” that P, coupled with a lack of “actual belie[f]” that Not-
P.16  Virtually all MPC-based knowledge instructions contain both 
definitions (1) and (2), and many include definition (3), presenting all three 
definitions as nonexclusive alternative bases for finding that the defendant 
acted knowingly.17  These definitions contain two central ambiguities, 
addressed below.   
                                                                                                                 
 13. Simons, Rethinking, supra note 1, at 470-71 (“[T]he concept of purpose is 
surprisingly unimportant: although the [MPC] distinguishes between purpose and knowledge 
in the definitional section, it only rarely distinguishes between them in the sections 
specifying requirements for individual offenses.”). 
 14. To be sure, purpose does entail a particular belief state, both as a conceptual matter 
and as a matter of legal definition under the MPC.  See LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY 
KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 35 (2009) (“[I]n 
order to act with criminal purpose, the actor must believe that his conduct increases the risk 
of harm”); MPC §§ 2.02(a)(ii) (to act “purposely” with respect to an attendant circumstance 
element, the defendant must be “aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes 
or hopes that they exist”); id. § 2.02 cmt., at 229-41 (“[T]he Code draws a narrow distinction 
between acting purposely and knowingly . . . .  Knowledge that the requisite external 
circumstances exist is a common element in both conceptions.”). That said, and somewhat 
mysteriously, the MPC’s definition of purpose as to a result element does not affirmatively 
require that the defendant possess any type of belief that the action at issue would increase 
the result’s probability.  See id. § 2.02(2)(a)(i). 
 15. Throughout this Article, “P” will represent an inculpatory proposition, and “Not-P” 
will represent its opposite.  So, for example, if “P” represents the proposition, “my partner 
will be armed,” “Not-P” represents the proposition, “my partner will not be armed.”  
 16. See Simons, Should the Model, supra note 7, at 182 n.9 (noting that “the Code's 
definition of knowledge as to a circumstance must be derived from two sources: the basic 
definition, ‘aware that such circumstances exist,’ in § 2.02(2)(b)(i); and ‘aware of a high 
probability of its existence,’ in § 2.02(7),” and that “[t]he latter phrase presumably controls 
the former, since it is a weaker requirement.”). 
 17. See Robbins, supra note 8, at 226 n.3 (“Although the Code states that this provision 
is designed to combat the problem of deliberate ignorance, this statement is contained only 
in a comment. . . . Section 2.02(7), which contains the definition, does not place this 
restriction on its use.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th 
Cir. 1976) (en banc) (reasoning, in the context of willful ignorance, that “[t]o act 
‘knowingly’ . . . is not necessarily to act only with positive knowledge, but also to act with 
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One ambiguity concerns what constitutes “awareness” and “actual 
belief.”  To be “aware” that P, or to “actually believe” that P, must one be 
consciously considering P at the relevant time (sometimes called an 
“occurrent” belief state18), or could one instead merely be disposed to 
endorse P if asked, even if one is not consciously considering P at the 
relevant time (a “dispositional” belief state19)?  Furthermore, must one have 
some sort of internal conviction or acceptance of P “deep down,” or could 
one instead merely intellectually acknowledge that P, without any attendant 
emotion or conation?20  Neither the MPC’s drafters nor criminal law 
scholars have provided much in the way of analysis, leading Professor 
Douglas Husak to describe as “scandalous” the fact that scholars have “not 
made greater efforts to understand the nature of awareness,” a “pivotal 
topic” that is “radically under-theorized.”21   
Professor Husak begins his own analysis of awareness in the context of 
negligence and recklessness with a “crucial” observation: “awareness (or 
belief) need not be occurrent.”22  In other words, one can be “aware” that P 
or “actually believe” that P, in the legally relevant sense, even if one is not 
consciously considering P at present—so long as one has the right sort of 
“disposition” toward P such that one would acknowledge its truth if asked 
about it under normal conditions. Additionally, commentators construe 
awareness and belief as not requiring any conation or internal conviction.23  
                                                                                                                 
an awareness of the high probability of the existence of the fact in question”); accord 
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2069 (2011). 
 18. “Occurrent” belief is conscious endorsement at a given moment.  See Wesley 
Buckwalter & John Turri, In the Thick of Moral Motivation (Aug. 27, 2014) (manuscript at 
6), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2382383. 
 19. Id. 
 20. For a more complete account of these distinctions, see infra Section III.B.1.b. 
 21. Husak, supra note 4, at 207; see also Stephen P. Garvey, What's Wrong with 
Involuntary Manslaughter?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 333, 343-44 (2006); Kenneth R. Feinberg, 
Toward a New Approach to Proving Culpability: Mens Rea and the Proposed Federal 
Criminal Code, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 123, 128 (1980) (contrasting “awareness” with “belief 
drawn from inference”). 
 22. Husak, supra note 4, at 208; see also Douglas Husak, Distraction and Negligence, 
in PRINCIPLES AND VALUES IN CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
ANDREW ASHWORTH 81, 85 (Lucia Zedner & Julian V. Roberts eds., 2012). 
 23. An exception might be “depraved heart” or “extreme indifference” homicide.  See 
MPC § 210.2(1)(b).  Like some earlier common law mens rea concepts, it appears more 
overtly tied to a failure to deeply come to grips with or accept the risk that one’s action will 
result in another’s death. For a more traditional interpretation of “depraved heart” and 
“extreme indifference” homicide, see Kenneth W. Simons, Statistical Knowledge 
Deconstructed, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1, 57-58 (2012) [hereinafter Simons, Statistical Knowledge].  
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That is, the relevant inquiry in all cases concerning criminal knowledge is 
into the defendant’s cognitive disposition—his or her intellectual 
acknowledgment that P.  
Another ambiguity concerns the degree of confidence one must have in 
the truth of P in order to be “practically certain” that P or to be aware of its 
“high probability.”24 Commentators agree on two parts of an admittedly 
incomplete answer.  First, the answer is not “it depends on the situation.”  
Rather, whatever the requisite degree of certainty may be, it is contextually 
invariant; to know that P, one needs X amount of certainty that P, 
regardless of what P is.  Professor Kenneth W. Simons sums up this 
consensus view nicely when, in contrasting knowledge with the 
predominant view of recklessness, he writes, “[o]f course, knowledge is 
indeed an invariant mental state; when it is required, the actor must be 
aware of a ‘high probability’ or a ‘practical certainty,’ period, without 
regard to any other factors.”25 
The second point of agreement among commentators is that, whatever 
this certainty level is, it is above 50%, and probably considerably higher 
than 50%.  It must be at least above 50%, commentators reason, because 
knowledge that P entails belief that P and belief that P entails 
acknowledgment of P’s being more likely true than not.26  It must be 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Some jurisdictions use slight variations in wording that are subject to the same 
ambiguities and analysis here provided.  See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(b) (West 
1994) (defining knowledge as to a result element as requiring that one be “reasonably 
certain” that one will cause the result); see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/4-5 (West 
2014) (defining “knowledge” as conscious awareness of “substantial probability”). Ohio 
avoids some of the ambiguities by defining knowledge as awareness that a result or 
circumstance is merely “probabl[e].”  See 29 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.22(B) (Lexis 
Nexis 2014). 
 25. Simons, Should the Model, supra note 7, at 189-90; see also Kimberly Kessler 
Ferzan, Holistic Culpability, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2523, 2536, 2529-30 (2007); Alan C. 
Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 953, 972 (1998) 
(distinguishing knowledge from other belief states by virtue of its attendant degree of 
subjective certainty). 
 26. See MPC § 2.02(7) cmt. 9, at 248 (stating that the invocation of “high” probability is 
designed to deal with deliberate ignorance, which the Commentary describes as involving 
“the case of the actor who is aware of the probable existence of a material fact but does not 
determine whether it exists or does not exist”) (emphasis added); Garvey, supra note 21, at 
371 n.22 (“[T]he text of §2.02(7) presupposes that an actor can at the same time believe that 
the probability that p exists is high while at the same time believing that p does not exist. But 
the belief that the probability that p exists is high precludes the belief that p does not exist, or 
at least precludes holding that belief rationally.”); Jonathan L. Marcus, Note, Model Penal 
Code Section 2.02(7) and Willful Blindness, 102 YALE L.J. 2231, 2255 (1993) (“[I]t is 
difficult to imagine how one can simultaneously be aware of a high probability that a fact 
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significantly above 50% because (a) “[o]ne would not normally say that one 
knows something unless one feels fairly certain of it in one’s mind,”27 and 
(b) the MPC’s distinction between recklessness and knowledge is premised 
on there being a significant difference between awareness of a merely 
“substantial” probability (recklessness) and awareness of a “high” 
probability (knowledge).28  The MPC’s drafters apparently considered 
“high” probability to denote something significantly above 50%, as 
evidenced by their distinguishing, in the Commentaries, the MPC’s “high 
probability” form of knowledge from Ohio’s “more expansive” code, which 
allows for satisfaction of the knowledge requirement where a result or 
circumstance is merely “probable.”29 
2. Recklessly and Negligently 
MPC-based jury instructions defining recklessness and negligence use 
similar structure and phrasing.  One is reckless if one (a) “consciously 
disregards” (b) a “substantial and unjustifiable risk,” where (c) “considering 
the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known 
to him,” such disregard “involves a gross deviation” from reasonable 
                                                                                                                 
exists yet believe that it does not exist.”); Husak & Callender, supra note 8, at 51 (stating 
that a drug courier aware of a 33% risk that his suitcase contains narcotics could not believe 
that there is a “high” probability that his suitcase contains drugs for purposes of MPC § 
2.02(7)).  But see Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2073 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“One can 
believe that there is a ‘high probability’ that acts might infringe a patent but nonetheless 
conclude they do not infringe.”). 
 27. Robin Charlow, Wilful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 
1373 & n.105 (1992) (“What is important is to indicate that the level of belief is 
exceptionally high when knowledge is involved.”); see WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. 
SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 239 (2d ed. 1986) (stating that “knowledge” requires at least “a 
consciousness of almost-certainty”); United States v. Golamb, 811 F.2d 787, 792 (2d Cir. 
1987) (“Knowledge and belief are very different mental states; knowledge implies a much 
higher degree of certainty.”).  Going further still, Professor Robins writes that “criminal 
knowledge requires certainty and a corresponding absence of doubt,” so that the MPC’s 
definition of knowledge, in allowing for a probability assessment to count as knowledge 
despite the fact that probabilities “impl[y] an absence of certainty,” fails to track the concept 
of “criminal knowledge.” Robbins, supra note 8, at 222 & n.208. 
 28. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 26, at 2240 (“‛[H]igh probability’ entails well over a 
51% chance of harm.”); Charlow, supra note 27, at 1382 (“[I]n order to ‘know’ one must be 
aware of the certainty or near certainty of a fact, and in order to be ‘reckless' one must be 
aware of, at most, the substantial probability of a fact.”); Simons, Rethinking, supra note 1, 
at 474 (“Criminal law distinguishes recklessness from knowledge according to a single 
factor: whether the actor believed that the risk was merely ‘substantial’ (recklessness) or 
instead ‘highly probable’ (knowledge).”). 
 29. See MPC § 2.02 cmt. 9, n.43. 
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standards of conduct.30  One is negligent if one (a) “should be aware of” (b) 
a “substantial and unjustifiable risk,” where (c) “considering the nature and 
purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him,” the actor’s 
“failure to perceive” the risk involves a gross deviation from reasonable 
standards of conduct.31  This Section notes three sources of ambiguity, and 
their resolution by commentators, below. 
The first source of ambiguity concerns recklessness’ requirement that the 
defendant “consciously disregard” a risk, and negligence’s requirement that 
the defendant “fail[] to perceive” a risk.32  Both requirements contain 
similar ambiguities to those addressed above with respect to “awareness.”  
For starters, does “conscious disregard” or a “failure to perceive” imply an 
occurrent state, as opposed to a dispositional one?  Scholars are divided.33  
And must “conscious disregard” involve some sort of inner conviction, or 
does it require merely a cognitive, intellectual acknowledgment that the risk 
exists?  Scholars seem to construe it as requiring only the latter, though 
without explicitly addressing the distinction.  Finally, in order to have 
“consciously disregard[ed]” a substantial and unjustifiable risk, how certain 
must the defendant have been that the risk was substantial and/or 
unjustifiable?  Scholars appear not to have addressed the issue.34 
Second, both recklessness and negligence instructions require 
consideration of “the circumstances known to” the defendant.35 Does 
“knowledge” in this context mean the same thing it means elsewhere in the 
MPC?  Some scholars construe the term differently here, treating it as if it 
means merely “belief.”36  Others argue that here, as elsewhere, knowledge 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id. § 2.02(2)(c). 
 31. Id. § 2.02(2)(d). 
 32. Id. §§ 2.02(2)(c), (d). 
 33. Garvey, supra note 21, at 344 n.55 (collecting sources). 
 34. Scholars differ over the distinct but related question of whether the reckless actor 
need recognize both the risk’s substantiality and its unjustifiability, or instead merely one or 
the other.  See, e.g., Claire Finkelstein, Responsibility for Unintended Consequences, 2 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 579, 594-95 (2005) (arguing that the reckless actor must be aware of the risk's 
substantiality); Joshua Dressler, Does One Mens Rea Fit All?: Thoughts on Alexander's 
Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 955 (2000) (arguing that the 
reckless actor need be aware only of the risk’s unjustifiability); David M. Treiman, 
Recklessness and the Model Penal Code, 9 AM. J. CRIM. L. 281, 362 (1981) (arguing that 
“the actor need not be aware that the risk is unjustifiable”).  The question I raise here is not 
what the object of the reckless actor’s awareness must be—e.g., the risk’s substantiality, its 
unjustifiability, or both—but rather, what it means to be “aware” of something in the 
relevant sense. 
 35. MPC §§ 2.02(2)(c)-(d). 
 36. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 514 n.30 (collecting sources). 
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requires more than mere belief, pointing out that the MPC drafters, in 
numerous spots where they intended to invoke mere belief, use the word 
“belief” and not “knowledge.”37 
Third, both recklessness and negligence instructions depend on whether 
the risk at issue was “substantial and unjustifiable.”38  Consider the 
“substantial” requirement.  How much risk counts as “substantial” risk?  
Some scholars treat substantiality as wholly dependent upon 
unjustifiability, so that there is no substantiality requirement, only 
unjustifiability.39  Other scholars, hesitant to read the substantiality 
requirement out of the Code, favor an interpretation according to which a 
“substantial” risk is one that surpasses an unspecified but contextually 
invariant likelihood threshold—though one that is far below 50%.40  Now 
consider the “unjustifiable” requirement.  How risky must something be in 
order to constitute an “unjustifiable” risk?  All agree that the answer is, 
roughly, “it depends on the situation”—i.e., on how bad it would be if the 
risk came to fruition and on what reasons the actor has for engaging in the 
risky activity.41  In other words, the “unjustifiability” requirement for 
recklessness and negligence, along with the invocation of a “gross 
deviation” from “reasonable” standards of conduct, makes these mental-
state concepts contextually “variant” and normatively “evaluative.” They 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See id. at 515-27 (arguing that the MPC’s historical background supports the 
contention that its invocation of knowledge, as opposed to mere belief, in section 2.02(2)(c)-
(d) was intentional); Eric A. Johnson, Is the Idea of Objective Probability Incoherent?, 29 
LAW & PHIL. 419, 428-29 (2010) (arguing that the MPC’s use of both the phrase 
“circumstances known to [him]” and the phrase “circumstances as he believes them to be” 
reflects the drafters’ awareness of the distinction between the two); see also examples cited 
supra note 12. 
 38. MPC §§ 2.02(2)(c)-(d). 
 39. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 26, at 239 (“[I]f there is no social utility in doing 
what he is doing, one might be reckless though the chances of harm are something less than 
1%.”); see also Dressler, supra note 34, at 959 (arguing that “substantial” should be read to 
modify “unjustifiable,” such that reckless actors must believe they are taking a “substantially 
unjustified” risk, and not necessarily that the risk is substantial); ALEXANDER & FERZAN, 
supra note 14, at 25 (arguing that “the ‘substantiality’ prong of the definition should be 
eliminated”). 
 40. See Simons, Should the Model, supra note 7, at 190 (“If this threshold view is 
correct, then, in order for an actor to be reckless as to causing bodily injury to another, he 
must be aware of at least (say) a 5% risk that his blow will injure the victim.”); Treiman, 
supra note 34, at 337-38 (“The second function that the requirement of substantiality might 
serve is as an exclusion of de minimis violations of the law.”). 
 41. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 115 (1998); 
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 27, at 239. 
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are thus unlike knowledge, which is supposed to be contextually “invariant” 
and “purely descriptive.”42  
B. The Federal Criminal Code 
The federal criminal code employs a far greater array of mental state 
terms than does the MPC,43 and these terms are typically left undefined in 
the statutes in which they are found.  Moreover, the same terms are defined 
differently depending on which substantive crime is at issue, which federal 
circuit one is in, and which judge within a given district is crafting the 
jury’s instructions.  Nonetheless, a broad overview is possible.  It is also 
worthwhile: the federal courts are a particularly important example of a 
non-MPC jurisdiction, and federal judges possess greater discretion than do 
judges in MPC jurisdictions in both (a) defining mental state terms invoked 
in statutes, and (b) choosing which mental state terms to employ where the 
statute is silent.44 
There are three primary ways federal criminal jury instructions address 
the concept of knowledge.45  First, some instructions leave undefined what 
                                                                                                                 
 42. See, e.g., SAMUEL PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL: RETHINKING THE LAW OF MURDER AND 
MANSLAUGHTER 83-85 (1998); Simons, Should the Model, supra note 7, at 199; Kenneth W. 
Simons, Understanding the Topography of Moral and Criminal Law Norms, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 228, 248 n.51 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. 
Green eds., 2011) [hereinafter Simons, Understanding the Topography]; Martin R. Gardner, 
The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and 
Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 725; Ferzan, supra note 24, at 2536, 2529-30; Larry 
Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 931, 940 (2000). 
 43. See S. REP. NO. 95-605, pt. 1, at 55 (1977) (“The National Commission's consultant 
[on Reform of the Federal Criminal Law] . . . identified 78 different [mens rea] terms used in 
present law.”); Feinberg, supra note 21, at 125.  Moreover, where the federal code’s 
provisions fail to specify a mens rea, federal courts typically supply one as a matter of 
interpretation.  See Darryl K. Brown, Federal Mens Rea Interpretation and the Limits of 
Culpability’s Relevance, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2012, at 109, 113. 
 44. See MPC § 2.02(3); Brown, supra note 43, at 113; United States v. Bailey, 100 S. 
Ct. 624, 630 (1980) (“Few areas of criminal law pose more difficulty than the proper 
definition of the mens rea required for any particular crime.”).  Recent scholarship contains a 
surprising dearth of systematic attention to federal mens rea terms, particularly given the 
increasing importance of, and scrutiny of, the federal criminal code more generally.  See 
Robert H. Joost, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Is It Possible?, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 195, 
195 (1997). 
 45. But see S. REP. NO. 96-553, at 60 (1980) (noting appellate courts’ use of five 
different meanings of “knowledge” in the federal criminal code).  The Senate Report 
explains, 
[knowledge] has been defined in terms of awareness; in terms of a defendant's 
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it means to “know” that P.  For example, jury instructions in the Eighth 
Circuit tend not to define the term, since, according to the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, its meaning is “a matter of common knowledge.”46  Even 
outside the Eighth Circuit the term is often undefined,47 especially, though 
certainly not exclusively, where it is invoked indirectly, as part of the 
definition of another mens rea term such as “intentionally” or “willfully.”48  
Second, many federal instructions employ the MPC’s formulation of 
knowledge, defining it as “awareness of a high probability” that P coupled 
with lack of “actual belief” that Not-P.49  Such instructions are often given 
in cases where the prosecution presents some minimal evidence of willful 
ignorance.50  They typically add a requirement that the defendant 
purposefully avoided acquiring additional certainty of P, though that 
                                                                                                                 
inference from the circumstances or belief that something is probably true; in 
terms of a defendant's awareness of a “high probability” that a circumstance 
exists; in terms of intentional or purposeful or “studied ignorance” as to the 
existence of a fact; and in terms of “gross indifference to” or “willful neglect 
of” a duty in respect to ascertainment of particular facts.  
Id. 
 46. United States v. Evans, 431 F.3d 342, 347-48 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Brown, 33 F.3d 1014, 1017 (8th Cir. 1994); see also MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT § 7.03 (Judicial Comm. on 
Model Jury Instructions for the Eight Circuit 2013).  
 47. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 80 F.3d 329, 331 (9th Cir. 1996); PATTERN 
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.06 (Comm. on Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions Dist. 
Judges Ass’n Sixth Circuit 2013).  Sometimes the term “knowingly” is defined in jury 
instructions simply as “with knowledge.”  See, e.g., United States v. Guzman, 781 F.2d 428, 
431 (5th Cir. 1986).   
 48. In Rosemond, for example, as is common with aiding and abetting instructions, the 
instruction simply stated that the jury must determine whether the defendant “knew” that his 
partner was, or would be, armed.  Jury Instructions at 46, United States v. Rosemond, No. 
2:07-CR-886 (D. Utah 2011).  Although the Supreme Court’s decision with respect to those 
instructions spoke of knowledge as “awareness,” “full awareness,” or “full knowledge,” the 
Court gave no indication that the instructions erred in not defining the term itself as it 
appeared in the count for aiding and abetting.  See Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 
1240, 1248-50 (2014). 
 49. See, e.g., Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2069 (2011); 
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 46 (1969) (using MPC § 2.02(7)’s definition of 
“knowledge” where neither statutory definition nor relevant legislative history was 
available). As these and many other cases indicate, non-MPC jurisdictions such as the 
federal courts are heavily influenced by the MPC. 
 50. But see 1 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3A.01, 
at 11 (2011) (stating that “the giving of this instruction” absent evidence of willful ignorance 
in a federal circuit that requires such evidence “is subject to the harmless error rule, and has 
been excused on numerous occasions”) (collecting cases). 
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purposeful avoidance may simply be a failure to investigate when it would 
have been easy to do so.51  Third, federal jury instructions often state that 
“[t]he word ‘knowingly’ . . . means that the act was done voluntarily and 
intentionally and not because of mistake or accident,” or some close 
variation.52  Such instructions use a much more minimal conception of 
knowledge than that provided in MPC-based instructions and other federal 
instructions.53 
As for belief states other than “knowledge,” federal instructions 
frequently contain ambiguities similar to those previously noted with 
respect to recklessness and negligence under the MPC.54  For example, they 
employ terms like “conscious avoidance” and “awareness” that are 
ambiguous with respect to occurrent versus dispositional belief.55  
Likewise, federal statutes and instructions refer to what the defendant 
“actually believe[d]” or had “reason[] to believe,” where belief may be 
                                                                                                                 
 51. But see Michaels, supra note 25, at 988-89 (“In practice, the purposeful avoidance 
requirement adds practically nothing” since “liability may be predicated on omission to 
learn: The defendant need not close his eyes to be liable; he can be convicted for failure to 
investigate.”).  Indeed, Judge Posner’s opinion in United States v. Giovannetti, often cited as 
a more strenuous assertion of the need for evidence of “deliberate effort to avoid guilty 
knowledge,” notes that such effort “can be a mental, as well as a physical, effort—a cutting 
off of one’s normal curiosity by an effort of will.”  919 F.2d 1223, 1229 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 52. See, e.g., PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) § 2.13 (Comm. on Pattern 
Criminal Jury Instructions First Circuit 1998)); ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) § 9.1A (Comm. on Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions of 
the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit 2010).  Such instructions, though common, have 
received little attention from commentators discussing mental state requirements.  This is 
noteworthy in part because, if taken literally, popular versions of the instruction imply that a 
defendant who was ignorant of P, but who would have taken the same action had she known 
that P, acted “knowingly” with respect to P, since such a defendant acts “intentionally and 
voluntarily, and not because of ignorance or mistake.”  Cf. Michaels, supra note 25 (arguing 
that a similar counterfactual-based mental state should be employed in criminal law). 
 53. Despite their seemingly minimal requirements for knowledge, it bears emphasis that 
neither these instructions, nor other federal criminal instructions, use the term “believe” as a 
substitute for “know.” In other words, in the jury instructions that follow the abstract 
definition of “to act knowingly,” the issue is always presented as whether the defendant 
“knew that” P, not whether the defendant merely “believed that” P. 
 54. See, e.g., ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 14, at 25 (noting that the MPC 
recklessness “formulation is substantially the same as the formulations of recklessness in 
federal and state criminal codes and judicial decisions”). 
 55. See, e.g., United States v. Lange, 528 F.2d 1280, 1288 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating that 
“conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth” plus “reckless disregard of the truth” suffices 
for knowledge that a statement was false for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1001). 
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construed as a “deep down” emotional or conative acceptance or as merely 
intellectual acknowledgment.56 
III. An Empirically Informed Account of Belief State Ascription 
The previous Section gave an overview of the many places where 
criminal law invokes belief states.  It also highlighted ambiguities in jury 
instructions with respect to belief states, noting previous attempts to resolve 
those ambiguities and thus to explain precisely what factual findings are 
required to satisfy various mens rea requirements.  This Section temporarily 
sets aside commentators’ attempts to make sense of those legally salient 
concepts and examines instead how laypeople, in response to circumstantial 
evidence, interpret and ascribe belief states.  In doing so, it draws from 
experimental epistemology, an area of empirical research previously 
overlooked in the legal literature. 
A. Introducing Experimental Epistemology 
Philosophers (and legal theorists) often appeal to supposedly widely 
shared intuitions about what does and does not constitute a given belief 
state.57  Experimental epistemologists investigate empirically whether 
laypeople actually share the intuitions to which “armchair” philosophers 
appeal, in the hopes that philosophical analyses of belief-state concepts can 
be made to more accurately account for lay-usage.58  Whatever the 
implications for philosophical analyses of the concepts in question, 
experimental epistemologists’ findings concerning how laypeople ascribe 
belief states help fill a crucial gap in our understanding of legally relevant 
belief states. 
                                                                                                                 
 56. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339 (2012) (criminalizing the harboring or concealing of 
those the defendant “knows, or has reasonable grounds to believe,” have committed or are 
about to commit certain offenses); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 46 n.93 (1969) 
(utilizing the MPC’s definition of knowledge, which requires an absence of “actual belief” 
that Not-P); United States v. Gansman, 657 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2011) (upholding a 
“conscious avoidance” instruction employing the “actual belief” language from the MPC). 
 57. For examples from criminal theory, see sources cited supra notes 7-8.  For a recent 
example from evidence theory, see David Enoch & Talia Fisher, Sense and “Sensitivity”: 
Epistemic and Instrumental Approaches to Statistical Evidence, 67 STAN. L. REV. 557, 573-
74 (2015).  For critical discussion of philosophers’ use of intuition, along with examples 
from the philosophical literature, see, for example, Jonathan M. Weinberg et al., Are 
Philosophers Expert Intuiters?, 23 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 331 (2010). 
 58. For an introduction to this and other research projects in experimental epistemology, 
see ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL EPISTEMOLOGY (James R. Beebe ed., 2014). 
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Before turning to belief states specifically, this Section begins with an 
introduction to one of the central findings in experimental philosophy: the 
“Side-Effect Effect.”  Although the Side-Effect Effect concerns desire-state 
and causal-influence ascription rather than belief-state ascription, 
understanding it will help in understanding its close relative, the Epistemic 
Side-Effect Effect, which concerns belief-state ascription. 
1. The Side-Effect Effect 
In his seminal 2003 study of desire-state ascription (more specifically, 
intentionality), Professor Joshua Knobe presented subjects with the 
following vignette (with two variations indicated in italics): 
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the 
board and said, “We are thinking of starting a new program.  We 
are sure that it will help us increase profits, and it will also 
help/harm the environment.”  The chairman of the board 
answered, “I don’t care at all about helping/harming the 
environment.  I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s 
start the new program.”  They started the new program. Sure 
enough, the environment was helped/harmed.59 
Subjects in the “help” condition were asked, “Did the chairman help the 
environment intentionally?”  A large majority said “no.”60  Subjects in the 
“harm” condition were asked whether the chairman harmed the 
environment intentionally.  A large majority said “yes.”61  This 
phenomenon—laypeople’s ascription of intentionality to agents bringing 
about counter-normative side effects but not to agents bringing about norm-
compliant side effects62—is known as the “Knobe Effect” or the “Side-
Effect Effect” (SEE). 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Joshua Knobe, Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language, 63 
ANALYSIS 190 (2003). 
 60. Id. at 195 (77% of subjects). 
 61. Id. (82% of subjects).   
 62. I use the term “norm-compliant” to mean merely “not in violation of a salient 
norm.”  To be norm-compliant, an action or an outcome need not have resulted from any 
desire or motivation to comply with a norm; it is enough that the action or outcome happens 
to comply with norms.  See Richard Holton, Norms and the Knobe Effect, 70 ANALYSIS 1 
(2010). 
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Since Knobe’s original study, a vast literature has replicated the same 
basic asymmetry in a broad range of cases.63  These studies altered, among 
other things, the characters, story structure, outcomes, and the properties 
that study participants were asked to ascribe.64  It turns out that the SEE is 
observable not just where an actor produces a bad side-effect (whether or 
not he is indifferent to the side-effect, as the chairman purports to be, or 
instead actively dislikes it), but also where an actor knowingly causes 
something bad to happen as a means to an end (whether or not the end is 
good or bad).65  And people’s willingness to ascribe intentionality in bad-
outcome cases persists even where the agent knew only of a very small risk 
that the outcome would come about.66  It also turns out that the asymmetry 
observed in intentionality ascription applies to a host of other desire-state 
ascriptions such as being “in favor of” the good or bad outcome.67  And 
even attributions of causal influence—i.e., the degree of causal 
responsibility attributed to the act in question as opposed to other partial 
causes—are significantly higher where an agent’s action results in a 
foreseen negative outcome rather than a foreseen positive one.68  Finally, it 
                                                                                                                 
 63. See Joshua Knobe, Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist, 33 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 
315, 317-20 (2010) (reviewing the literature); id. at 329-53 (open peer commentary, 
including reporting of additional experimental results). 
 64. Additionally, similar results were obtained in tests of Hindi speakers (using the 
Hindi word for “intentionally”), as well as with young children and those of different gender, 
education level, religion, and other demographic attributes.  See Joshua Knobe & Arudra 
Burra, The Folk Concepts of Intention and Intentional Action: A Cross-Cultural Study, 6 J. 
COGNITION & CULTURE 113 (2006); Alan M. Leslie et al., Acting Intentionally and the Side-
Effect Effect: Theory of Mind and Moral Judgment, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 421 (2006); Liane 
Young et al., Does Emotion Mediate the Relationship Between an Action’s Moral Status and 
Its Intentional Status? Neuropsychological Evidence, 6 J. COGNITION & CULTURE 291 
(2006). 
 65. See, e.g., Florian Cova & Hichem Naar, Side-Effect Effect Without Side Effects: The 
Pervasive Impact of Moral Considerations on Judgments of Intentionality, 25 PHIL. 
PSYCHOL. 837 (2012). 
 66. See Mueller et al., supra note 2, at 860. 
 67. See Dean Pettit & Joshua Knobe, The Pervasive Impact of Moral Judgment, 24 
MIND & LANGUAGE 586 (2009). 
 68. Craig Roxborough & Jill Cumby, Folk Psychological Concepts: Causation, 22 
PHIL. PSYCH. 205 (2009); Hitchcock & Knobe, supra note 6, at 602-05; Mark Alicke, 
Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSYCH. BULL. 556 (2000); Joshua 
Knobe & Ben Fraser, Causal Judgment and Moral Judgment: Two Experiments, in MORAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 441 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008); Lawrence M. Solan & Jonathan M. 
Darley, Causation, Contribution, and Legal Liability: An Empirical Study, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Autumn 2001, at 265 (vol. 64, no. 4); cf. Antony Honoré, Causation in the Law, in 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2010), http://plato.stanford. 
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turns out that the asymmetry is not merely a response to immorality on the 
part of the agent.  Instead, the SEE is observable where an action or 
outcome deviates from normative expectations, including where the 
deviation is from non-moral descriptive norms,69 and, perhaps most 
surprisingly, where the action is regarded as morally praiseworthy but 
deviates from prudential norms (i.e., is against the agent’s self-interest).70  
These findings are all puzzling.  Why would the normative implications 
of the chairman’s (or other protagonist’s) action affect the degree of 
intention, causal responsibility, etc., that laypeople ascribe to him or her?  
                                                                                                                 
edu/archives/win2010/entries/causation-law/ (echoing a central contention in H.L.A. HART 
& TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985), that in law as in normal 
conversation, “[t]he most persuasive explanations of an outcome are those that point to a 
condition that is abnormal or unexpected in the context or to a deliberate action designed to 
bring the outcome about”). 
 69. See Mark Alfano et al., The Centrality of Belief and Reflection in Knobe-Effect 
Cases: A Unified Account of the Data, 95 MONIST 264 (2012) (experiments concerning 
descriptive norms, conventional norms, and aesthetic norms); Joshua Knobe, Folk 
Psychology and Folk Morality: Response to Critics, 24 J. THEORETICAL & PHIL. PSYCHOL. 
270 (2004) (aesthetic norms); Joshua Knobe, Reason Explanation in Folk Psychology, 31 
MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 90 (2007) [hereinafter Knobe, Reason Explanation] (competing legal 
and moral norms); Joshua Knobe and Gabriel Mendlow, The Good, the Bad and the 
Blameworthy: Understanding the Role of Evaluative Reasoning in Folk Psychology, 24 J. 
THEORETICAL & PHIL. PSYCHOL. 252 (2004) (prudential norms); Kevin Uttich & Tania 
Lombrozo, Norms Inform Mental State Ascriptions: A Rational Explanation for the Side-
Effect Effect, 116 COGNITION 87 (2010) (conventional norms). 
 70. For example, in one study, subjects were presented the following vignette: 
Imagine that Steve and Jason are two friends who are competing against one 
another in an essay competition. Jason decides to help Steve edit his essay. 
Ellen, a mutual friend, says, “Don’t you realize that if you help Steve, you will 
decrease your own chances of winning the competition?” Jason responds, “I 
know that helping Steve decreases my chances of winning, but I don’t care at 
all about that. I just want to help my friend!” Sure enough, Steve wins the 
competition because of Jason’s help. 
Subjects were asked (a) how much praise Jason deserves and (b) whether Jason intentionally 
decreased his own chances of winning.  See Thomas Nadelhoffer, On Praise, Side Effects, 
and Folk Ascriptions of Intentionality, 24 J. THEORETICAL & PHIL. PSYCHOL. 196, 209 
(2004).  Participants considered Jason praiseworthy, while regarding the side effect as 
intentional at higher rates than in comparable norm-adhering vignettes.  Id. at 210.  For 
additional examples of the SEE in the cases of morally positive norm-deviation, see Joshua 
Knobe, Reason Explanation, supra note 69, at 102, 105-06 (protagonist violating a racial 
identification law akin to one used in Nazi Germany deemed to have more intentionally 
brought about side effect than same protagonist adhering to the racial identification law); 
Brian Robinson et al., Reversing the Side-Effect Effect: The Power of Salient Norms, 172 
PHIL. STUDY. 177 (2015); cf. Holton, supra note 62, at 2-3. 
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Scholars have proposed numerous explanations for the SEE that, for present 
purposes, can be divided into two camps: competence theories and error 
theories.   
First, competence theories posit that laypeople are competently applying 
the relevant concepts to the vignettes they are presented, but that it turns out 
concepts like intentionality and causality, properly understood and applied, 
depend in part on the normative valence of the actor’s action.71  In other 
words, competence theorists think that the SEE derives from a correct 
understanding of the concepts of intentionality and causality.  Turning to 
law, some competence theorists have argued that law should reflect 
laypeople’s conceptual understandings, and that law should therefore, more 
often than it currently does, treat foreknowledge of an outcome as sufficient 
for a finding that the actor intentionally caused that outcome.72   
The second group of explanations, error theories, posit that the SEE is a 
symptom of biased, or “motivated,” reasoning73—specifically, a desire to 
blame those who bring about a bad outcome, regardless of mental state.74  
Such error theories are sometimes called “blame first” models, because they 
posit that an initial impulse to blame leads people to ascribe whatever 
mental or causal attribute might justify that initial blame impulse.75 
Conversely, competence theories posit that attributions of blame come later 
in the process, after evaluation of the agent’s mental state.76  Error theorists 
typically argue that the law should not embrace laypeople’s ascription 
practices.77  Instead, error theorists think the SEE is evidence of undesirably 
normative considerations entering into mental-state and causality 
ascriptions that are supposed to be purely descriptive. 
                                                                                                                 
 71. See, e.g., Holton, supra note 62, at 4; Solan, supra note 2, at 525; Kobick & Knobe, 
supra note 2, at 413. 
 72. See, e.g., Kobick & Knobe, supra note 2 (ambiguous statutory provisions should be 
construed to reflect laypeople’s understandings and should therefore treat knowledge as 
sufficient for intent); Kobick, supra note 2 (same for constitutional law); Malle & Nelson, 
supra note 2 (same for criminal law); Joseph C. Mauro, Intentional Killing Without 
Intending to Kill: Knobe's Theory as a Rational Limit on Felony Murder, 73 LA. L. REV. 
1011 (2013) (felony murder rule should track lay-concept of intentionality).   
 73. See Peter H. Ditto et al., Motivated Moral Reasoning, in MORAL JUDGMENT AND 
DECISION MAKING: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION 307 (D. M. Bartels et 
al. eds., 2009); Eileen Braman & Thomas E. Nelson, Mechanisms of Motivated Reasoning? 
Analogical Perception in Discrimination Disputes, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 940, 941 (2007). 
 74. See, e.g., Mark D. Alicke, Blaming Badly, 8 J. COGNITION & CULTURE 179 (2008). 
 75. Bertram F. Malle et al., Moral, Cognitive, and Social: The Nature of Blame, in 
SOCIAL THINKING AND INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR 313 (Joseph P. Forgas et al. eds., 2012).   
 76. Id. 
 77. See, e.g., Nadelhoffer, supra note 2. 
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Neither explanation fully accounts for the data.  Competence theorists 
have trouble explaining why otherwise-irrelevant character information—
for example, telling subjects that the protagonist was a drug dealer—
increases desire-state and causality ascription (i.e., increases the extent to 
which laypeople find that the agent (a) intended to bring about the bad 
outcome and (b) was causally responsible for the outcome despite 
alternative causes).78  Likewise, error theorists have trouble explaining why 
the SEE occurs in cases where the agent’s norm-deviation is morally 
positive or morally neutral.79  They also have trouble substantiating the 
claim that blame attribution comes prior to mental state attribution, rather 
than the other way around.80 
Until recently, both explanations, along with all scholarship concerning 
the SEE, were also premised on a crucial and unfounded assumption—
namely, that study participants regarded the protagonists in the help and 
harm condition as knowing that the good or bad outcome would result.81  
That is, scholars sought to explain why subjects treated actors who 
“knowingly” brought about worse outcomes as if they had intentionally 
caused the outcomes. Until recently, however, nobody examined whether 
study participants were actually ascribing knowledge, or even belief, to the 
agent in both conditions.  Scholars failed to examine whether the 
differences in desire-state and causality ascription might be attributable to 
differences in something more fundamental: belief-state ascription.  As the 
next Section explains, that appears to be exactly what was happening. 
                                                                                                                 
 78. See Nadler & McDonnell, supra note 2. 
 79. See Alfano, supra note 69, at 277-78 (discussing Nadelhoffer’s “distortion theory” 
and concluding that it “will not suffice” to explain the SEE given the countervailing data); 
Holton, supra note 62, at 2-5; Knobe, supra note 63, at 322 (“[T]he experimental results 
again and again seemed to go against what would have been predicted on the motivational 
bias view [i.e., an “error theory” view].  At this point, the vast majority of researchers 
working on these questions have therefore concluded that the motivational bias hypothesis 
cannot explain the full range of experimental findings and that some other sort of 
psychological process must be at work here.”) (collecting sources); Edouard Machery, The 
Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Philosophical and Experimental Issues, 23 MIND & 
LANGUAGE 165 (2008); Jason Turner, Folk Intuitions, Asymmetry, and Intentional Side-
Effects, 24 J. THEORETICAL & PHIL. PSYCHOL. 214 (2004). 
 80. See Malle, supra note 76, at 323 (concluding that “the key claim of [blame early] 
models is, at present, not well supported”); Fiery Cushman, Crime and Punishment: 
Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment, 108 
COGNITION 353 (2008). 
 81. See James R. Beebe & Mark Jensen, Surprising Connections Between Knowledge 
and Action: The Robustness of the Epistemic Side-Effect Effect, 25 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 689, 709-
11 (2012) (providing numerous examples in the literature). 
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2. The Epistemic Side-Effect Effect 
It turns out that belief-state ascription reveals the same asymmetry 
previously noted for ascription of intentionality, causality, and other 
attributes.82  The first study to show this gave participants Knobe’s original 
chairman vignette and asked whether the chairman “knew” that the program 
would harm (or help) the environment. Respondents were significantly 
more likely to attribute knowledge to the chairman in the harm case than in 
the help case.83   
In subsequent studies, this phenomenon—the “Epistemic Side-Effect 
Effect” (ESEE)—has been consistently shown in the broad range of settings 
in which the SEE has been shown.84  In short, laypeople are significantly 
more likely to ascribe belief that P and knowledge that P where “P” is that a 
norm-deviant outcome will result, that a norm-deviant circumstance 
obtains, or that one’s action is norm-deviant, compared to where P is norm-
consistent.85  While the SEE showed that normative valence impacts desire-
state and causality ascription, the ESEE shows that it also impacts belief-
state ascription. 
The ESEE largely explains the SEE.  In the chairman studies, for 
example, people are more likely to ascribe intentionality, desire, causation, 
                                                                                                                 
 82. See id. at 691; John Turri, The Problem of ESEE Knowledge, 1 ERGO 101 (2014); 
Wesley Buckwalter, Gettier Made ESEE, 27 PHIL. PSYCH. 368 (2014) [hereinafter 
Buckwalter, Gettier Made ESEE]; James Beebe & Joseph Shea, Gettierized Knobe Effects, 
10 EPISTEME 219 (2013); James R. Beebe, A Knobe Effect for Belief Ascriptions, 4 REV. 
PHIL. & PSYCH. 235 (2013) [hereinafter Beebe, A Knobe Effect]; Nikolaus Dalbauer, & 
Andreas Hergovich, Is What Is Worse More Likely?—The Probabilistic Explanation of the 
Epistemic Side-Effect Effect, 4 REV. PHIL. & PSYCH. 639 (2013); James R. Beebe & Wesley 
Buckwalter, The Epistemic Side-Effect Effect, 25 MIND & LANGUAGE 474 (2010); James R. 
Beebe, Evaluative Effects on Knowledge Attributions, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO 
EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY (Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter, eds.) (forthcoming 
2016); Alfano, supra note 68. 
 83. Beebe & Buckwalter, supra note 82, at 476. 
 84. See supra notes 63-70, 82.  To be sure, there are more published SEE experiments 
than ESEE experiments.  After all, the latter effect was discovered relatively recently.  
Nonetheless, ESEE experiments to date have largely used the basic experimental structure 
and vignettes that the SEE studies use, and have found results that consistently track the SEE 
experiment results in these various settings. 
 85. Indeed, the same asymmetry appears even where: (a) subjects in the “harm” 
condition are told that the chairman was notified only that there was a “slight chance” that 
the new program would harm the environment, and (b) subjects in the “help” condition are 
told that the chairman was notified that there was a “very strong chance” that the new 
program would help the environment.  See Beebe & Jensen, supra note 81, at 707; Dalbauer, 
supra note 82.  
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etc., in the “harm” case than in the “help” case because they are more likely 
to ascribe to the chairman belief that the new policy will harm the 
environment, as well as knowledge that the policy will harm the 
environment.  Indeed, take away the differential belief and knowledge 
ascriptions, and the SEE nearly disappears.86   
But insofar as the ESEE explains the SEE, the question becomes: what 
explains the ESEE?  Why would the question of whether or not one 
believes that P or knows that P depend on the normative valence of one’s P-
relevant action?  This seems contrary to just about any philosophical or 
legal understanding of “knowledge” and “belief,” which are traditionally 
considered purely descriptive, non-evaluative mental state concepts.87   
As with the SEE, the ESEE may be explained using a competence theory 
or an error theory.  A competence theory would say that laypeople are 
competently applying the relevant concepts to the vignettes they are 
presented, but that it turns out concepts like “belief” and “knowledge,” 
properly understood and applied, depend in part on the normative valence 
of the actor’s action.88  Turning to law, a competence theorist could argue 
that law should, for example, allow smaller degrees of certainty to 
constitute “knowledge” where the agent’s action was especially counter-
normative.89 
                                                                                                                 
 86. In situations where the chairman receives no information about the environmental 
impact of the plan one way or another (i.e., nobody tells him it will help or harm it), the SEE 
diminishes greatly.  Sandra Pellizzoni et al., Beliefs and Moral Valence Affect Intentionality 
Attributions: The Case of Side Effects, 1 REV. PHIL. & PSYCHOL. 201, 201 (2010).  And when 
subjects are explicitly told that the chairman in the harm condition believes the policy will 
not harm the environment, and the chairman in the help condition believes the policy will 
not help the environment, the SEE disappears completely.  Id. 
 87. See sources cited supra note 42, infra notes 208-14 and accompanying text; N. 
Angel Pinillos & Shawn Simpson, Experimental Evidence Supporting Anti-Intellectualism 
About Knowledge, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL EPISTEMOLOGY, supra note 58, at 9.  But 
see John Turri & Wesley Buckwalter, Descartes’ Schism, Locke’s Reunion: Completing the 
Pragmatic Turn in Epistemology, AM. PHILOSOPHICAL Q. (forthcoming 2016) (tracing to 
John Locke the roots of philosophical accounts of knowledge as linked to “actionability”). 
To be more precise, the traditional conception of “knowledge” is evaluative insofar as it 
entails “justification,” which is a normative concept.  But the traditional notion of 
justification is epistemically evaluative; it is not supposed to concern evaluative 
considerations of the sort found in ESEE cases. 
 88. See Kobick & Knobe, supra note 2, at 413; Solan, supra note 2, at 525; Holton, 
supra note 62, at 2-4. 
 89. As explained further in Part IV, infra, I am dubious of such a quick move from the 
descriptive to the normative.  
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Alternatively, one might be tempted to endorse an error-based 
explanation of the ESEE.  Perhaps laypeople see a bad outcome, have an 
impulse to blame somebody, and satisfy that impulse by ascribing whatever 
mental state seems to inculpate the actor who brought the outcome about.90  
Turning to law, an error theorist could argue that the ESEE is evidence of 
undesirably normative considerations entering into what should be purely 
descriptive belief-state ascriptions.  As a result, the error theorist might 
propose means of “de-biasing” jurors’ belief-state ascriptions so that they 
are unaffected by how good or bad the defendant’s actions were. 
Although an error theory may be a good partial explanation for the 
ESEE, it fails to account for much of the data.91  First, it fails to account for 
the studies showing greater belief and knowledge attribution in cases of 
morally good or morally neutral norm-deviation.92  Second, the ESEE 
appears less susceptible to the sorts of otherwise-irrelevant bad character 
information that, when it increased intentionality- and causality-ascription 
rates in SEE harm scenarios, led some scholars to conclude that the 
asymmetries were largely attributable to motivated reasoning.93   
In short, the relative counter-normativity of P-relevant actions and their 
outcomes, rather than, or in addition to, the blameworthiness of the agent, 
plays a large role in determining whether an agent is deemed to have known 
or believed that P. In the following Section, I explain why this is so, not by 
relying on a philosophical or legal analysis of the concepts in question, but 
by couching the ESEE within a broader, empirically based account of 
laypeople’s belief-ascription practices and their functional concepts of 
knowledge and belief. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 90. This would be an interesting and important observation, and one that fits well within 
recent accounts of desire-state and causality ascription.  See, e.g., Nadler & McDonnell, 
supra note 2, at 301. 
 91. See generally James R. Beebe, Do Bad People Know More?  Interactions Between 
Attributions of Knowledge and Blame, SPRINGER LINK (Sept. 4, 2015), 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11229-015-0872-4 (published in the journal 
Synthese) (reporting “the results of seven new empirical studies that raise significant 
challenges to blame-based explanations of the ESEE”).  
 92. See Alfano et al., supra note 69, at 264, 274-76, 281-83 (surveying previous studies 
and reporting results from two new studies). 
 93. See Beebe & Jensen, supra note 81, at 702-03; Buckwalter, Gettier Made ESEE, 
supra note 82, at 368 (reporting results of an experiment indicating that the ESEE “is 
unlikely to be mediated by a simple desire to blame”). 
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B. Bringing the Data Together: A Descriptive Account of Belief State 
Ascription 
This Section provides an account of what factors influence laypeople’s 
belief-state ascription, using legal examples along the way.94  It does so in 
two steps, the first addressing belief ascription (along with awareness and 
similar concepts), and the second addressing knowledge ascription.95  These 
two steps can be summarized as follows: (1) counter-normativity spurs 
belief formation, and (2) “Actionability” makes (true) belief knowledge. 
1. Ascribing Belief 
Under what circumstances are laypeople likely to ascribe belief that P?  
In some cases, the answer is easy; perhaps the defendant admits to having 
believed that P, or his actions would make no sense unless he believed that 
P.  But where the evidence doesn’t obviously point one way or another, lay-
ascription will be influenced by both (a) how laypeople reason about other 
people’s thought processes, and (b) how laypeople interpret terms like 
“belief” and “awareness.”96  I address each in turn. 
a) The Norm-Violation / Belief-Ascription Heuristic 
As we have seen, laypeople more often ascribe belief that P to agents 
whose P-relevant actions were counter-normative.  Why would laypeople 
treat normative valence as relevant to the question of whether or not an 
agent believed that P?  The answer is that counter-normativity comes with 
the risk of sanctions, both formal and informal, and that risk makes it 
comparatively more useful to form true beliefs to the effect that one is 
violating a norm than to form true beliefs to the effect that one is adhering 
to a norm.97  So unless evidence strongly implies otherwise, laypeople 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Although this Section uses legal examples by way of illustration, Part IV, infra, 
explains more fully how these belief state ascription practices relate to criminal law. 
 95. This second step is where the ESEE is explained.  See infra Section III.B.2. 
 96. This Article’s account of lay-ascription does not concern trials in which evidence 
obviously establishes the defendant’s mental state, leaving no room for reasonable 
disagreement.  Instead, this Article addresses what might be called “close cases,” in much 
the same way that theories of adjudication often focus on “hard cases” to determine what 
factors influence judges’ interpretations of ambiguous statutory language.  Likewise, this 
Article does not attempt to delineate every single factor that might influence a given juror’s 
belief state ascription even in close cases—e.g., whether the defendant appeared honest 
while testifying, what the juror ate for breakfast, etc. Instead, it focuses on several 
underappreciated factors highlighted by recent empirical literature discussed above. 
 97. Alfano et al., supra note 69, at 268-70.  Of course, external sanctions need not be 
the only reason norm-deviations give agents pause. Given agents’ self-interest and moral 
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presume that others pause to form an accurate belief one way or another 
before deviating from a norm.98  In short, laypeople employ what may be 
called the “norm-violation/belief-ascription heuristic”:  all else being equal, 
insofar as an agent’s action would make it the case that X, where X violates 
a norm salient to the agent, attribute to the agent the belief that the action at 
issue would make it the case that X.99 Where the norm violation is less 
serious or less salient to the actor, people are less likely to ascribe such 
beliefs. Conversely, where the norm violation is more serious or more 
salient, people are more likely to ascribe such beliefs. 
b) Different Kinds of Belief: Occurrent and Dispositional, Thick and 
Thin 
Laypeople’s ascriptions of belief are responsive not only to how 
laypeople reason about other minds but also to what they understand terms 
like “belief” to mean.  As it turns out, laypeople understand the concept of 
“belief” to signify several distinct types of mental states.  Experimental 
epistemologists noted this phenomenon when investigating why—contrary 
to virtually all previous philosophical accounts of knowledge100 (and 
contrary to all legal accounts of knowledge)101—laypeople sometimes 
ascribe to an agent knowledge that P while simultaneously ascribing to that 
                                                                                                                 
conscience, it is sensible to assume agents are cautious about breaking norms even where 
they believe the chance of detection is zero. 
 98. Recall that the chairman in the original ESEE example stated that he did not care 
about the environment.  Still, it is reasonable for study participants to posit that he cared 
enough about the consequences (to others or, perhaps more likely to himself) of harming the 
environment to form a true belief about it—hence the greater belief attribution to the 
chairman in the harm scenario (where his actions are norm deviant) than in the help scenario 
(where his actions are norm-compliant).  Cf. Holton, supra note 62, at 1. 
 99. See Alfano et al., supra note 69, at 268 (proposing a slightly different formulation of 
what they label the “Norm-violation/Belief-attribution heuristic”).  Generally speaking, the 
greater the norm violation, the more useful the formation of the true belief in question, and 
hence the more likely the agent is to form such a true belief.  As a result, laypeople will be 
especially likely to ascribe to an agent belief that P where P represents a more serious or 
consequential norm violation.  Of course, whereas my explanation for the heuristic explains 
it in terms of how people reason about other minds, a “blame first” error theory might 
instead posit that the more serious the norm-deviation, the more motivated one is to blame 
the agent.  Either way, the resulting pattern of belief ascription is the same. 
 100. See Buckwalter & Turri, supra note 18, at 8. 
 101. Although a few philosophers have questioned the belief requirement, see, e.g., Colin 
Radford, Knowledge—By Examples, 27 ANALYSIS 1, 4-5, 11 (1966), legal scholars and 
judges have not, see, e.g., sources cited supra notes 7-8. 
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agent no belief that P.102  How, experimental philosophers wondered, could 
people ascribe knowledge that P without belief that P?  Doesn’t knowledge 
entail belief?103  The answer turns out to be that knowledge does require 
“belief,” but it requires a more minimal type of belief than laypeople 
sometimes interpret words like “belief” to denote.  This raises an important 
point: when we ask laypeople to ascribe belief (along with related terms 
like “awareness” and “conscious disregard”), context will determine which 
type of belief they take to be at issue. 
First, beliefs can be occurrent or dispositional.104  Occurrent belief is 
conscious endorsement at a given moment.105  Dispositional belief is 
information stored in the mind available for endorsement under typical 
conditions.106  Here is one example where laypeople’s implicit 
understanding of belief as either dispositional or occurrent determines their 
ascriptions of belief and knowledge:  Kate panics during her history exam 
and, despite having repeatedly memorized the date of Queen Elizabeth’s 
death, feels sure she has forgotten.107  She answers “1603,” thinking it just a 
guess, but in fact that is the correct answer.108  Most study participants 
presented with this vignette assumed “belief” meant occurrent belief, and 
consequently ascribed to Kate knowledge that Queen Elizabeth died in 
1603 but not belief that she died in 1603.109  In follow-up studies, however, 
participants were primed to consider dispositional belief, and consequently 
                                                                                                                 
 102. See Beebe, A Knobe Effect, supra note 82, at 239; Blake Myers-Schulz & Eric 
Schwitzgebel, Knowing That P Without Believing That P, 47 NOUS 371, 371, 378-80 (2013); 
Wesley Buckwalter et al., Belief Through Thick and Thin, NOUS 1, 6, 18 (Sept. 15, 2013), 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nous.12048/pdf; Buckwalter & Turri, supra note 
18, at 9 (calling these results “shocking”). 
 103. See Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa & Matthias Steup, The Analysis of Knowledge, in 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2014), http://plato. 
stanford.\edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/ (“The belief condition . . . is certainly accepted by 
orthodoxy.”); Luban, supra note 7, at  961 (“[K]knowledge does require belief—I can hardly 
be said to know something if I don’t even believe it”). 
 104. See Buckwalter & Turri, supra note 18, at 9; see also Eric Schwitzgebel, Acting 
Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs or the Gulf Between Occurrent Judgment and 
Dispositional Belief, 91 PACIFIC PHIL. Q. 531 (2010). 
 105. David Rose & Jonathan Schaffer, Knowledge Entails Dispositional Belief, 166 PHIL. 
STUD. 19, 22 (2013). 
 106. Id. This is only a rough definition of dispositional belief, as the notion of “typical 
conditions” is ambiguous and may not best describe examples of “thick” dispositional belief. 
See discussion infra text accompanying notes 115-116. 
 107. Myers-Schulz & Schwitzgebel, supra note 102, at 375.  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
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ascribed both knowledge and belief.110  Other vignettes produce similar 
findings.111   
To take a legal example, imagine a ski instructor, Hall, who skis down a 
hill in an unusually dangerous manner, contrary to any advice he would 
give even an experienced skier.  Hall accidentally crashes into another 
skier, killing the other skier.112  Did Hall believe his action posed such risk 
of death (that is, was he aware of the risk so as to be knowing or reckless)?  
Or did Hall instead have no such belief (that is, did he fail to consider 
whether, or was he unaware that, his action posed such a risk, so as to be 
negligent or legally blameless)?  If one employs a concept of occurrent 
belief, one is much more likely to conclude that Hall had no such belief; he 
was likely not consciously considering the risk as he zoomed down the hill.  
Indeed, because knowledge does not entail occurrent belief (i.e., knowledge 
can involve merely dispositional belief),113 someone primed to consider 
occurrent belief might even say Hall knew that skiing in such a manner 
posed such an unjustifiable risk, but he did not believe or was not aware of 
it at the relevant time, much as Kate knew but did not believe that Queen 
Elizabeth died in 1603.114  But if one instead employs a concept of 
dispositional belief, one is likely to conclude Hall did believe that skiing in 
that manner posed a grave risk; as a ski instructor, he was likely aware of 
the risk as a general matter even if he wasn’t consciously considering it at 
the time.115  In short, whether the defendant was aware of the risk depends 
on whether awareness is occurrent or dispositional, and some factual 
scenarios and instructions prime different answers to that question. 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Rose & Schaffer, supra note 105, at 34-35. 
 111. Id. at 35-40. 
 112. This example is based on People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207 (Colo. 2000) (en banc). 
 113. Rose & Schaffer, supra note 105, at 23. 
 114. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text. 
 115. In the Hall case, after remand from the Colorado Supreme Court, the trial court’s 
MPC-based instructions defined recklessness simply as “conscious[] disregard[]” of “a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk.”  Jury Instructions at 14, People v. Hall, 59 P.3d 298 
(Colo. App. 2002) (No. 97 CR 167).  The instructions then stated that “[w]hether a person 
consciously disregards such a risk may be inferred from either the actors [sic] subjective 
knowledge of the risk or what a reasonable person with the actor’s subjective knowledge of 
the risk or what a reasonable person with the actor’s knowledge and experience would have 
been aware of in the particular situation.” Id. at 15.  The jury ultimately convicted Hall of 
negligence, which, in line with the MPC, the jury instructions defined as “fail[ure] to 
perceive” a substantial and unjustifiable risk.  Id. at 18; see People v. Hall, 59 P.3d at 299. 
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Second, and independent of the occurrent versus dispositional 
distinction, beliefs can be either “thin” or “thick.”116  Thin belief requires 
merely a “bare cognitive pro-attitude,”117 the sort of belief people have 
whenever they think the proposition in question is more likely true than not 
true.  Thick belief requires some sort of emotion or conation,118 which can 
be roughly described as an “inner conviction” as to the truth of the 
proposition in question.119  
To see the difference between thin and thick belief, consider the 
following example.  George the Geocentrist answers on a test that the earth 
revolves around the sun. In some sense George acknowledges this on an 
intellectual level, but, due to deeply felt religious conviction, he believes 
that the sun revolves around the earth.120  As it turns out, a significant 
number of laypeople attribute to George knowledge that the earth revolves 
around the sun but not belief that it does (once again, an ascription pattern 
previously deemed incoherent).121  They do this because, contrary to legal 
conceptions of belief as an intellectual probabilistic judgment, the factual 
scenario implicitly primes them to consider belief in its thick form, which 
requires some deeper form of mental assent or inner conviction.  Other 
vignettes (not involving religious faith) produce similar findings.122   
To take a legal example, imagine a case in which a chairman like the one 
in Knobe’s original vignette is criminally prosecuted for harming the 
environment.123 The question of belief state arises: Did the chairman 
believe or know the environment would be harmed (recklessness or 
knowledge), or did he fail to consider whether it would be harmed 
(negligence or legal blamelessness)?  If one employs a concept of thick 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Buckwalter et al., supra note 102, at 2; see also Buckwalter & Turri, supra note 18, 
at 7-14 (surveying experimental findings and concluding that “in light of these results, any 
program of philosophical or psychological research on ‘belief’ should take into account the 
difference between thick belief and thin belief”); Dylan Murray et al., God Knows (But Does 
God Believe?), 166 PHIL. STUD. 83 (2013).  Thick beliefs and thin beliefs can be either 
occurrent or dispositional. 
 117. Buckwalter et al., supra note 102, at 2. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Murray et al., supra note 116, at 102-05.   
 120. Buckwalter et al., supra note 102, at 12-14. 
 121. Id. at 12-14. 
 122. See id. at 14-20; Myers-Schulz & Schwitzgebel, supra note 102, at 374-78 
(reporting studies resulting in greater ascription of knowledge than belief to, for example, a 
husband considering whether his wife is cheating on him, and to a subconsciously prejudiced 
professor considering whether student athletes are just as academically capable as non-
athletes). 
 123. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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belief, one is more likely to conclude that the chairman did not believe the 
policy would harm the environment.  Perhaps the busy, flippant chairman 
didn’t care enough about environmental harm to have formed the sort of 
deeper coming-to-grips-with or acceptance that would satisfy a thick belief 
requirement.  Indeed, employing a concept of thick belief, one might even 
say the chairman knew the environment would be harmed but did not really 
believe it.  Study participants in the chairman studies, after all, reported 
greater confidence in ascribing knowledge to the chairman than in ascribing 
belief.124  But if instead one employs a concept of thin belief, one is more 
likely to conclude that the chairman did believe that the environment would 
be harmed—i.e., that on a purely intellectual level, he acknowledged that 
the environment would likely be harmed.  
The distinction between thick and thin belief, though only briefly 
sketched here, may make a dispositive difference in jurors’ mens rea 
findings in numerous legal contexts, including, for example, cases in which: 
(1) the defendant purports to have a deep religious conviction relevant to 
P;125 (2) the defendant purports to have a cognitive defect related to 
practical or moral reasoning, such as an inability to “appreciate” the 
wrongfulness of her actions;126 (3) the defendant is a group entity (e.g., a 
corporation), arguably incapable of possessing thick beliefs, or at least less 
likely than an individual to possess them;127 (4) the defendant seemingly 
                                                                                                                 
 124. Beebe, A Knobe Effect, supra note 82, at 253. 
 125. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text; ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 
14, at 45-46 (discussing cases, cited in LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS: 
CONUNDRUMS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1987), in which an actor kills someone and claims 
sincere belief that the victim was a witch, not a human, and legal liability turns in part on 
whether the actor “knowingly” killed a human); MPC § 3.02(1) (affirmative defense where 
actor “believe[d]” conduct was necessary to avoid greater harm). 
 126. See MPC § 4.01 (insanity defense available where defendant cannot “appreciate the 
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct”); M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 
1843) (insanity defense available where defendant did not “know the nature and quality of 
the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was 
wrong”).   
 127. Group agents may be thought incapable of possessing mental states, let alone thick 
beliefs.  But there is mounting evidence that laypeople are comfortable ascribing to them a 
large array of mental states, some of which may be thick.  See, e.g., Avital Mentovich et al., 
The Psychology of Corporate Rights 4-5, 11-12 (Univ. of Chi. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory 
Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 497, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2467372 (reporting 
empirical evidence of laypeople’s ascribing religious convictions to corporations); Adrianna C. 
Jenkins et al., The Neural Bases of Directed and Spontaneous Mental State Attributions to 
Group Agents, 9 PLOS ONE e105341 (2014), http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchObject. 
action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0105341&representation=PDF (reporting results of 
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engaged in “wishful thinking” or some similar form of self-deception;128 or 
(5) the defendant’s actions appear to have arisen from sub-conscious 
prejudice.129 
To summarize the two main points concerning belief ascription: (a) 
laypeople tend to ascribe belief that P to an agent taking a P-relevant action 
where P is norm-deviant,130 and (b) laypeople’s belief ascriptions are 
sensitive to what type of belief (occurrent or dispositional, thick or thin) 
they are primed to consider. 
2. Ascribing Knowledge 
 When is a belief that P deemed knowledge that P?  Laypeople’s 
knowledge ascriptions typically reflect the following conception of 
knowledge131: An agent knows that P if (1) P is true, (2) the agent believes 
that P (in any sense—dispositionally or occurrently, thickly or thinly), and 
(3) the agent’s belief that P is “Actionable.”  The first requirement—the 
truth condition—is familiar and relatively uncontroversial.132  The second 
requirement—the belief condition—is part of the traditional definition of 
knowledge, though it contains some refinement in light of the different 
kinds of belief described above.133  The third requirement—the 
                                                                                                                 
fMRI testing revealing that laypeople exhibit similar mental patterns when considering a 
corporate entity’s mental state and an individual’s mental state).  In the corporate context, the 
difference between thick and thin belief may influence not only the guilt versus innocence 
question posed to jurors in criminal trials but also the triggering of punitive damages in civil 
cases.  Jurors might interpret a corporation’s having undertaken explicit cost-benefit analyses, 
for example, as evidence that a corporation engaged in the sort of reflective coming-to-grips-
with or premeditation sometimes associated with thick belief.  Cf. W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate 
Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, in CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES 
DECIDE 112 (2002).  
 128. See Myers-Shultz & Schwitzgebel, supra note 102, at 378-80 (reporting results from 
studies concerning wishful thinking); David Sackris & James R. Beebe, Is Justification 
Necessary for Knowledge?, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL EPISTEMOLOGY, supra note 58, 
at 190 (same). 
 129. See Myers-Shultz & Schwitzgebel, supra note 102, at 375, 378-80 (reporting results 
from studies concerning subconscious prejudice). 
 130. That is, they tend to ascribe at least thin, dispositional belief. 
 131. There are no doubt counter-examples and exceptions to the construal of knowledge 
offered here.  But at the very least, as spelled out in more detail below, it comes closer to 
capturing laypeople’s concept of knowledge (as that concept operates in both civil and 
criminal cases, though the focus here is on criminal cases) than does the prevailing account 
offered by legal theorists and philosophers.  
 132. Wesley Buckwalter, Factive Verbs and Protagonist Projection, 11 EPISTEME 391, 
391 (2014). 
 133. See supra notes 104-29 and accompanying text. 
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Actionability condition—is likely new to most readers and requires 
unpacking.134 
 An agent’s belief is Actionable when (a) it is relevant to some salient 
practical decision, and (b) for purposes of making the practical decision, the 
agent ought (rationally) to treat its truth as settled, given the agent’s values, 
desires, degree of subjective certainty, and practical circumstances.  In 
other words, an agent’s belief that P is Actionable when, in deciding how to 
act, the agent ought to assume that P. 
 An agent’s degree of subjective certainty is an important determinant of 
whether her belief was Actionable.  But—and this will be important when, 
in Part IV below, we return to the supposed differences between knowledge 
and recklessness—the amount of subjective certainty required to make a 
belief Actionable depends on context.. More specifically, the requisite 
amount of subjective certainty varies according to (a) pragmatic features of 
the agent’s situation, and (b) the normative valence of the course of action 
at issue.  I address each in turn below. 
a) Pragmatic Features of the Agent’s Situation 
Whether a true belief was Actionable, and thus counted as knowledge, 
often depends on the practical options available to the agent at the time she 
engaged in the P-relevant action in question.  Agents often act in situations 
that don’t require a stark choice between P and Not-P.  They can hedge 
their bets because they have courses of action available that allow for a 
probability assessment to influence the action in question.  When such 
alternative courses of action are available, an agent’s bare belief that P (as 
opposed to her more nuanced probability assessment) is less likely to be 
Actionable and is thus less likely to be deemed knowledge that P.135   
                                                                                                                 
 134. See Turri & Buckwalter, supra note 87, at 4.  Two traditional conditions of 
knowledge will strike philosophers as conspicuously absent: (1) justification, and (2) a 
proper causal relation between the justificatory evidence and the belief formed.  See 
Ichikawa & Steup, supra note 103.  Both can be set aside for present purposes.  First, 
justification is largely captured by the Actionability requirement and in any event appears to 
play a relatively minor role in lay-ascription.  See Buckwalter, Gettier Made ESEE, supra 
note 82, at 368; Sackris & Beebe, supra note 128, at 189 (reporting empirical evidence that 
laypeople ascribe knowledge to agents whose true beliefs are not “justified” according to the 
traditional philosophical account of justification); Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman, The 
Folk Conception of Knowledge, 124 COGNITION 272, 280 (2012).  Second, the “causal 
relation” condition is relevant to lay-ascription only in an extremely small subset of cases 
and is rarely implicated in criminal cases.  See John Turri et al., Knowledge and Luck, 
PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 378, 382 (2015).  
 135. See generally Turri & Buckwalter, supra note 87. 
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To take a legal example, imagine a drug “mule” who was handed a 
briefcase and told to transport it for money.136  She believed it 60% likely 
that the briefcase contained drugs.  She wouldn’t have transported the 
briefcase if she had been 100% certain that it contained drugs, but given her 
view of the odds and the money involved, she decided to transport the 
briefcase, which, as it turns out, did in fact have drugs inside.  She believed 
there were drugs inside, but did she know there were drugs inside?   
Imagine two scenarios.  In Scenario 1, the briefcase was locked and she 
had no means of opening it.  She had no way of obtaining greater certainty, 
so in deciding what to do, she should have proceeded on the assumption 
that there were drugs inside.  In other words, her belief that there were 
drugs inside was Actionable.  Therefore, regardless which course of action 
she ultimately decided on—transport it or don’t transport it—she will likely 
be deemed to have known that there were drugs inside.137  In effect, 
laypeople treat the question, “Did she know there were drugs in the 
briefcase?” as meaning, “For practical purposes, did she know there were 
drugs in the briefcase?”138   
In Scenario 2, the briefcase is not locked and she is aware of an available 
low-cost alternative course of action: she could look inside the briefcase.  In 
Scenario 2, given her preferences and the courses of action available to her, 
she should not treat the truth of the proposition, “there are drugs inside,” as 
settled.  Instead, she should act as if “there is a 60% chance that there are 
drugs inside”—i.e., she should look inside the briefcase.  Whereas in 
Scenario 1 there was no practical difference between acting as if there were 
drugs inside and acting as if there was a 60% chance there were drugs 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Cf. infra notes 180-98 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between 
knowledge and willful ignorance). 
 137. I use the word “likely” to once again highlight that the factor affecting knowledge 
ascription here influences, but does not fully dictate, an ascription of knowledge.  As noted 
previously, there are plenty of additional factors that would bear on whether the drug mule 
would be deemed to have knowledge.  As with the study of judicial behavior—or any human 
behavior, for that matter—this Article does not attempt to account for every such possible 
influence.  Cf. supra note 96.  Additionally, the phrase “will be deemed to have knowledge,” 
highlights that the important thing here, as elsewhere in this Article, is whether jurors would 
call a given mental state “knowledge” in every-day life or in court, not whether the mental 
state lives up to some other more absolute concept of knowledge that diverges from lay 
usage.  See supra note 58 and accompanying text; infra note 211 and accompanying text. 
 138. For empirical literature concerning the related issue of stakes to the agent of being 
wrong about P, and how those stakes impact knowledge ascription, see Pinillos & Simpson, 
supra note 87; Chandra Sekhar Sripada & Jason Stanley, Empirical Tests of Interest-Relative 
Invariantism, 9 EPISTEME 3 (2012); Turri & Buckwalter, supra note 87, at 25 (concluding 
that the stakes effect on knowledge ascription is fully mediated by Actionability). 
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inside, in Scenario 2 there is a difference.  Because she has this alternative 
action available in Scenario 2 but not in Scenario 1, her bare belief that 
there were drugs in the briefcase was Actionable in Scenerio 1 but not in 
Scenario 2, and is thus, all else being equal, more likely to be deemed 
knowledge in Scenario 1 than in Scenario 2. 
As the drug mule example illustrates, one important alternative course of 
action that affects Actionability is the possibility of considering further 
whether P or Not-P, either through consulting additional evidence or 
through engaging in additional deliberation.  Sometimes, though, that 
alternative course of action is unavailable due to time constraints.  An 
agent’s time constraints thus sometimes affect Actionability and thereby 
affect knowledge ascription.   
For example, in one experiment participants were asked about a medical 
student who, due to an extreme shortage in hospital personnel, is put in 
charge of a patient and must decide which of three medications to 
administer.139  In one scenario, she has months to decide, and she picks the 
right one.  In another she has two minutes to decide, and she picks the right 
one.  In both, she believes the medication she picks is the right one.  
Participants were significantly more likely to say the student “knew” the 
medication she picked was the right one when she had two minutes to 
deliberate rather than several months.140  Another experiment found the 
same effect when asking about whether a college student who cares a lot 
about his paper “knows” his paper contains no misspellings, where in one 
scenario he has five minutes to proofread it and in the other he has two 
weeks.141  In short, at least in some circumstances, all else being equal, the 
less time you have to consider whether P, the more likely your belief that P 
is to be deemed knowledge that P.   
More generally, where for practical purposes one must act as if P or Not-
P, one’s belief that P or that Not-P is deemed knowledge (so long as it turns 
out to be true), even if one had lingering subjective uncertainty.  In other 
words, under sufficient practical constraints, knowledge ascription tends to 
collapse into (true) belief ascription because mere belief, under sufficient 
practical constraints, is Actionable.   
That said, such practical constraints are often not present; agents often 
have additional time to deliberate, additional evidence to consult, etc.  
When the agent is not so practically constrained, the amount of subjective 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Joseph Shin, Time Constraints and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge, 11 
EPISTEME 157, 160-61 (2014). 
 140. Id. at 163. 
 141. Id. at 165. 
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certainty necessary to make a belief Actionable often depends on the 
normative valence of the salient action to which that belief is relevant.  
Let’s now briefly turn to those normative considerations.  
b) Normative Valence of the Course of Action at Issue  
Where moral norms are salient, they predominate in the Actionability 
analysis.  If, and to the extent that, a P-relevant action would deviate from a 
moral norm in the event P is true, the agent’s belief that P is likely to be 
deemed Actionable.142  In other words, the worse (in terms of morality) that 
P being true would make an agent’s action, the more likely that the agent’s 
belief that P constitutes knowledge that P.  That’s because, where P is 
moral norm-deviant, one need not have very great subjective certainty that 
P in order to make it the case that one ought to act as if P—i.e., in order to 
make it the case that one’s belief that P is Actionable.   
Consider again the chairman example.143  Imagine that the chairmen in 
the harm and help conditions each believe the vice president’s testimony, 
thinking it 60% likely that the new program will help or harm the 
environment as the case may be.  Why might the belief be considered 
Actionable, and hence knowledge, in the harm condition but not the help 
condition?  Because the stakes, in terms of potential moral norm-deviation, 
are higher in the harm condition than in the help condition.144  The greater 
the moral norm-deviation, the lower the subjective certainty required to 
make the belief knowledge.  This same pattern accounts for the numerous 
experimental findings discussed and cited above, which go far beyond the 
chairman example.145  A similar explanation even makes sense of the 
otherwise-puzzling ESEE findings in cases of morally positive and morally 
neutral norm-deviation,146 though those cases are less directly relevant to 
criminal law.147 
                                                                                                                 
 142. See Beebe & Buckwalter, supra note 82, at 494; Buckwalter, Gettier Made ESEE, 
supra note 82, at 380.   
 143. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 144. In the help condition, whether or not the chairman’s belief turns out to be correct 
and the environment is helped, the outcome will not violate a moral norm, since merely 
failing to actively help the environment is not moral norm-deviant.  See, e.g., Holton, supra 
note 62, at 3-4; Solan, supra note 2, at 524-25.  But in the harm condition, the moral stakes 
are higher, since approving a policy that harms the environment is moral norm-deviant. 
 145. See supra Section III.A. 
 146. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.  Where there is no moral duty at 
issue, and P’s being true would make an action go against one’s self-interest or would make 
an action go against convention, for example, one’s belief that P requires less certainty in 
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IV. Surprising Divergences Between Mens Rea Theory and Practice: What 
They Are, Why They Matter, and How to Begin Addressing Them 
A brief recap is in order.  Part II examined possible ways to construe the 
belief states invoked in criminal jury instructions.  Those instructions 
contain numerous ambiguities concerning the make-up of the belief states 
they tell jurors to ascribe.  Commentators offering descriptive and 
normative accounts of criminal mens rea concepts have sought to explain 
and resolve some of these ambiguities, though without recourse to 
empirical findings concerning lay-usage.   
Part III examined the ways laypeople construe and ascribe belief, 
knowledge, and other belief states.  Broadly speaking, it demonstrated two 
things.  First, belief-state ascription (including knowledge ascription) is 
much more dependent upon normative and pragmatic features of the agent’s 
situation than legal and philosophical accounts have traditionally 
                                                                                                                 
order to be Actionable than it would require if it were norm-compliant.  See supra notes 69-
70 and accompanying text.   
Consider, as an example of the influence of non-moral norms, a long-standing puzzle in 
the philosophical literature concerning lotteries:  If a lottery ticket holder is aware that there 
is only a one-in-a-million chance her ticket is a winner, why are laypeople hesitant to ascribe 
to her, prior to the announcement of the winning number, knowledge that her ticket is a 
loser?  See JOHN HAWTHORNE, KNOWLEDGE AND LOTTERIES (2004); Enoch & Fisher, supra 
note 57, at  573-74 (using the lottery example as an allegedly “nonpractical” illustration of 
laypeople’s aversion to ascribing knowledge based on naked statistical evidence); John Turri 
& Ori Friedman, Winners and Losers in the Folk Epistemology of Lotteries, in ADVANCES IN 
EXPERIMENTAL EPISTEMOLOGY, supra note 58, at 45.  My analysis above suggests an 
answer: the lottery ticket holder, even if she believes her ticket is almost certainly a loser, 
should not act on the assumption that it is a loser, but instead should act on her more 
nuanced probability assessment—i.e., that she has a ticket with a one-in-a-million chance of 
being a winner.  There is a real, salient practical difference between these two ways of 
acting: in the latter, but not the former, she should hold onto the ticket and check, when the 
winning number is announced, to see whether her ticket is a winner.  That is the rational 
course of action for a lottery player to take, given her preferences (she has, after all, bothered 
to obtain a ticket!).  Because she should not ignore or discard the ticket prior to the 
announcement of the winning number, her bare belief that the ticket is a loser is not 
Actionable, and she is thus unlikely to be ascribed knowledge that the ticket is a loser 
despite the overwhelming odds and her awareness of those odds. 
 147. Criminal law typically concerns deviations from salient moral norms.  Nonetheless, 
morally neutral and morally positive norm-deviation cases are worth noting because of their 
implications (a) for error theories and competence theories (i.e., whether the SEE, ESEE, 
and other findings are wholly attributable to blame-based motivated reasoning), and (b) for 
areas of criminal law that do not mirror moral norms (e.g., malum prohibitum offenses).   
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assumed.148  Second, beliefs vary in kind—they can be occurrent or 
dispositional, thick or thin—and laypeople’s belief-state ascription often 
depends on which type of belief they assume they’re being asked about. 
This Part returns to the specific ambiguities in mens rea concepts 
described in Part II and examines, in light of the lay-ascription practices 
outlined in Part III, how jurors are likely to resolve them.  That is, it 
examines how jurors are likely to construe and ascribe belief, knowledge, 
and other legally relevant belief states in criminal trials.  It focuses on 
several areas of systematic divergence between, on the one hand, what 
scholars, judges, and code drafters think mens rea terms mean and, on the 
other hand, what those terms actually mean as implemented by jurors 
adhering to jury instructions.  After describing each divergence, this Section 
explains why the divergence matters and how it might be addressed.  
Finally, Section IV.E argues that current institutional mechanisms are ill-
designed to note and remedy problematic mens rea instructions, 
highlighting the need for further research in this area.  
A. The Vanishing Distinction Between Knowledge and Recklessness 
Recall the scholarly consensus concerning the difference between 
knowledge and recklessness under the MPC.  Knowledge that P is thought 
to be an “invariant” and “purely descriptive” mental state:  it requires (a) 
true belief that P, plus (b) some contextually invariant level of certainty that 
significantly exceeds a 50% probability assessment, (c) without regard to 
any other factors.149  Even outside the MPC, this closely tracks the 
conventional wisdom regarding what “knowledge” means when used in 
ordinary speech and thus when it appears undefined in statutes and jury 
instructions, as frequently happens in federal criminal cases.150  
Recklessness, on the other hand, is a “variant” and “evaluative” mental 
                                                                                                                 
 148. This conclusion coheres with a more general discovery central to much of 
experimental philosophy, namely, the pervasive impact of evaluative and pragmatic factors 
on laypeople’s ascription of concepts previously thought to be less context-dependent and 
evaluative and more purely descriptive.  See Knobe, supra note 63 (reviewing the literature). 
 149. See Simons, Should the Model, supra note 7, at 189; Ferzan, supra note 24, at 2529-
30 (distinguishing “mechanical” mens rea concepts such as purpose, knowledge, and willful 
blindness under the MPC, from “evaluative” mens rea concepts such as MPC recklessness 
and negligence); Simons, Understanding the Topography, supra note 41, at 248 n.51; 
Gardner, supra note 42, at 725 (MPC “purpose” and “knowledge” are fully descriptive, 
while “recklessness” has both descriptive and evaluative aspects); Alexander, supra note 41, 
at 940. 
 150. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. 
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state.151  What constitutes an “unjustifiable” (if not also a “substantial”)152 
risk shifts according to normative and pragmatic aspects of the actor’s 
situation—i.e., according to whether, “considering the nature and purpose 
of the actor’s conduct,” taking the risky action represents a gross deviation 
from reasonable standards of conduct.153 
This distinction between knowledge as an invariant, descriptive mental 
state and recklessness as a variant, evaluative mental state falls apart in 
practice.  As discussed in Part III, laypeople construe “knowledge” that P as 
what one might call “practical certainty” that P, where practical certainty 
means something like: “for practical purposes, certain enough that P to 
make it the case that someone in the agent’s situation should act as if P.”154  
In other words, laypeople treat knowledge as a contextually variant and 
evaluative mental state much like recklessness.155 
To review, here is how the normative and pragmatic features typically 
associated with recklessness factor into knowledge ascription.  Where 
circumstantial evidence of mental state is a close call, and P turned out to 
be true, jurors will employ the norm-violation / belief-ascription heuristic, 
tending to construe the defendant as having had awareness of a risk that 
P,156 and as having had a belief that P.157  Any type of belief—whether 
                                                                                                                 
 151. See supra notes 41-42, 54 and accompanying text. 
 152. See supra notes 34, 39-41 and accompanying text, infra note 199. 
 153. MPC § 2.02; cf. id. cmt. 3, at 237 (“[T]he acceptability of a risk in a given case 
depends on a great many variables.”). 
 154. See supra Section III.B.2. Interestingly, the MPC defines knowledge as to results in 
terms of being “aware that it is practically certain that [one’s] conduct will cause such a 
result.”  MPC § 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (emphasis added).  But there is no indication in the MPC’s 
drafting history or the criminal theory literature that “practically certain,” as used in that 
definition, refers to Actionability, as opposed to meaning “almost certain.”   
 155. For an overview of evolutionary game theory literature suggesting the usefulness of 
such a practical concept of “knowledge,” see James Beebe, Social Functions of Knowledge 
Attributions, in KNOWLEDGE ASCRIPTIONS 220 (Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken eds., 2012). 
 156. For this reason, it is unsurprising that, in a recent study, jury-eligible laypeople 
tasked with matching descriptions of mental states to their proper MPC mens rea terms 
mistakenly labeled negligence as recklessness 31% of the time.  See Francis X. Shen et al., 
Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306, 1343 (2011).  They did this despite being 
provided the MPC definitions of each, and despite receiving direct descriptions of the 
defendant’s mental state—rather than having to infer it from circumstantial evidence—
which described the mental state in similar terms to the MPC definitions with which they 
were to be matched.  Id. at 1330-33.  In the face of even a small amount of ambiguity 
concerning whether the defendant was aware of the risk, people can be expected to resolve 
the ambiguity in favor of a finding of awareness, even where the action at issue represented 
only a trivial, non-criminal norm-deviation.  See id. at 1330 (providing the language used to 
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occurrent or dispositional, thick or thin—will suffice for knowledge so long 
as it was Actionable.158   
The question of whether a belief that P was Actionable can be restated as 
follows: Would a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation have acted 
as if P?159  The question can be fleshed out in terms of the pragmatic and 
normative considerations outlined in Part III.  For example, if the defendant 
was forced to act as if either P or Not-P, and no alternative “hedging” 
courses of action were available—e.g., if there was no time to deliberate, or 
no additional evidence to obtain before deciding how to act—then the 
defendant’s bare belief that P was Actionable.  The reasonable person in 
such a situation, believing that P, would act as if P.160  What if the 
defendant had other available courses of action?  In that case, moral norms 
will play a decisive role in determining Actionability.161  The defendant’s 
belief that P was Actionable insofar as (1) the defendant’s P-relevant action 
would be moral norm-deviant in the event that P turned out to be true (i.e., 
in the event the risk is borne out), and (2) the defendant had no overriding 
reason (moral, prudential, or otherwise) not to simply take P as settled and 
act as if P.162  Where P then turns out to be true—i.e., where the risk of 
which the defendant was aware is borne out—the defendant was both 
reckless and knowing.  Virtually the same considerations determined both 
attributions.163   
What role, then, does the defendant’s degree of subjective certainty 
actually play in determining whether he possessed knowledge or instead 
mere belief?  Degree of subjective certainty is important only insofar as it 
bears on Actionability.  Any requisite certainty threshold for knowledge, if 
                                                                                                                 
signify negligence in the study’s vignettes, such as “carelessly,” “wasn’t paying attention,” 
and “hurriedly”); supra Section III.A.1.  
 157. See supra Section III.A.1. 
 158. See supra notes 132-35, 138 and accompanying text. 
 159. Cf. MPC § 2.02(2)(c) (defining recklessness in terms of “the standard of conduct 
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation”). 
 160. See supra Section III.B.2.a. 
 161. See supra Section III.B.2.b.  They may not play such a role in the case of malum 
prohibitum crimes and in other areas where jurors do not think the criminalized act at issue 
is immoral.  In those cases, prudential and descriptive norms will play a more significant 
role.  See supra notes 69-70, 146-47 and accompanying text. 
 162. Cf. MPC § 2.02(2)(c) (including in the definition of recklessness consideration of 
“the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct”); supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 163. Indeed, given that recklessness requires a “gross deviation” from reasonable 
standards of conduct, it may in some instances be a higher bar than knowledge, which has no 
such requirement.  Compare MPC § 2.02(2)(c) with id. § 2.02(2)(b). 
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there is one, depends on context (e.g., normative and pragmatic factors, 
type of belief primed) and can get at least as low as 50%.164 
But, one might object, surely jury instructions convey a different “legal 
definition” that distinguishes knowledge from recklessness and renders 
jurors’ prior natural language-based understanding irrelevant.  Not so.  
Many federal instructions offer no definition of “knowledge.”165  And under 
the MPC, recall the open questions concerning what counts as a “substantial 
and unjustifiable” risk that P (for recklessness), as opposed to a “high 
probability” that P or a “practical certainty” that P (for knowledge).  The 
terms “substantial,” “high,” and even “practical,” are heavily context-
sensitive, as shown not only by commonsense reflection on ordinary 
language but also empirical linguistic research.166  Such vague directives 
leave jurors to construe the term “knowledge” in court much as they do out 
of court, which is to say, in a way that reflects the sorts of pragmatic and 
normative considerations that recklessness tracks.  Indeed, they are told to 
do nothing to the contrary.  For this reason it is no surprise that, in a recent 
study, jury-eligible laypeople tasked with matching descriptions of mental 
states to their proper MPC mens rea terms, even when provided the MPC’s 
mens rea definitions, fared only slightly better than chance at distinguishing 
knowledge from recklessness, and indeed, chose “knowledge” more often 
                                                                                                                 
 164. To be clear, I do not mean to imply that laypeople will always or typically think in 
such numerical terms without prompting, nor that they will typically think in terms that are 
reducible to numerical probabilities without losing important information potentially bearing 
on the defendant’s culpability.   
Moreover, where thick belief is primed, laypeople may even allow the probability 
sufficient for a belief that fulfills knowledge’s belief requirement to, in effect, dip below 
50%.  That is, laypeople might think a thick belief that goes against the evidence—even in 
the defendant’s own estimation—is nonetheless Actionable, especially where the belief in 
question is perceived to be a useful or morally praiseworthy belief to have.  See Sackris & 
Beebe, supra note 128, at 175-87 (reporting experiments in which subjects ascribed 
knowledge to (1) a father who, despite overwhelming evidence against his daughter, believes 
she did not commit a crime, and (2) a husband who, despite the evidence against his wife’s 
prospects for surviving cancer, believes she will survive).  But see Husak & Callender, supra 
note 8, at 38-39 (reasoning that awareness of a less than 50% chance that P entails “actual 
belief” that Not-P). 
 165. See supra notes 43-45. 
 166. See e.g., Paul Egre & Florian Cova, Moral Asymmetries and the Semantics of 
“Many”, 8 SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS 13 (2015), http://semprag.org/article/view/sp.8.13/ 
pdf_8_13; Stephanie Solt, Vagueness in Quantity: Two Case Studies from a Linguistic 
Perspective, in UNDERSTANDING VAGUENESS: LOGICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND LINGUISTIC 
PERSPECTIVES 157 (Petr Cintula et al. eds., 2011); Shalom Lappin, An Intensional 
Parametric Semantics for Vague Quantifiers, 23 LINGUISTICS & PHIL. 599 (2000). 
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than “recklessness” when recklessness was the correct answer.167  In 
practice, there is virtually no difference between recklessness and 
knowledge. 
This lack of difference matters for at least three reasons.  First, since 
“knowledge” in criminal law is a more capacious category than the 
conventional wisdom suggests, laypeople likely “over”-ascribe knowledge 
to criminal defendants.  That is, laypeople ascribe knowledge in more cases 
than would be warranted on the more lofty, rarefied understanding of 
knowledge assumed in the scholarly literature, MPC commentaries, and 
case law, and they do so while adhering to current jury instructions. 
Second, a prosecutor’s decision to charge a defendant with a crime 
requiring knowledge, as opposed to a crime requiring recklessness, can 
drastically increase the defendant’s punishment without any corresponding 
difference in the actual underlying mental state the jury will be asked to 
ascribe.  For example, in Colorado, an MPC jurisdiction, a knowing 
homicide carries a mandatory sentence of between sixteen and forty-eight 
years,168 while a reckless homicide carries a non-mandatory sentence of two 
to six years.169 
Third, for legislatures drafting criminal codes and judges deciding which 
mental state to read into statutes that fail to specify a mens rea, the choice 
                                                                                                                 
 167. See Shen et al., supra note 156, at 1343 (reporting that subjects: (a) correctly labeled 
instances of knowledge only 50% of the time, inaccurately labeling them as “reckless” 30% 
of the time; and (b) correctly labeled instances of recklessness only 40% of the time, 
inaccurately labeling them knowledge 42% of the time); id. at 1346 n.94 (noting that “[i]t is 
not the purpose of this Article to explore the many reasons why subjects might have 
difficulty at this K/R boundary”).  Study participants fared better in distinguishing 
negligence from recklessness and were much more accurate in sorting other mental states.  
Id. at 1343 (reporting 78% and 88% accuracy rates in matching “purposely” and “blameless” 
vignettes, respectively, with their proper MPC definition).  In a follow-up study, “[r]educing 
the communicated probability (e.g., from ‘very likely’ to ‘some risk’ and from ‘likelihood’ 
to ‘real risk’)” in the study vignettes’ descriptions of reckless protagonists’ mental state, 
“improved the ability of participants to accurately identify the mental state”—i.e., to match it 
to the correct MPC definition.  Matthew R. Ginther et. al., The Language of Mens Rea, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 1327, 1356 (2014).  Still, the authors write, 
Even in our best case, only 59% of subjects are accurately identifying 
R[ecklessness] scenarios. . . .  About 70% of these misidentifications are 
subjects believing that a[] R[ecklessness] scenario demonstrates knowing 
conduct on the part of the protagonist.  We are still left with the basic 
conclusion we reached in the original study: laypeople have great difficulty 
identifying and distinguishing reckless and knowing behavior. 
Id. at 1359.  
 168.  COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-103(1), 18-3-103(3)(a), 18-1.3-406 (2015). 
 169. Id. §§ 18-3-104, 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A). 
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between knowledge and recklessness typically makes little difference to the 
guilt/innocence determination under the current jury-instruction regime.  
Drawing the line at knowledge, rather than recklessness, is in this respect 
more arbitrary and inconsequential than has been previously assumed.170 
Unfortunately, while the mental state these terms invoke may not differ in 
practice, the consequences for defendants at the sentencing stage may be 
great, presumably owing to legislatures’ or courts’ failure, when 
determining appropriate sentences, to appreciate the lack of difference in 
the underlying mental states.171 
If the current distinction between recklessness and knowledge is 
problematic, there are two broad ways criminal law might address the 
problem: abandon the distinction or salvage it.  Abandoning the distinction 
would be relatively easy to implement.  Salvaging the distinction is more 
difficult, in that it calls for some sort of clarification in jury instructions 
concerning knowledge.  One way would be to explicitly quantify the degree 
of subjective certainty necessary for a belief to count as knowledge—say, 
90% certainty.172  This would make knowledge a less variant and evaluative 
mental state.  It would also force jurors to consider belief in the 
probabilistic terms in which legal scholars typically describe it, rather than 
the thick type of belief that factual circumstances sometimes prime jurors to 
                                                                                                                 
 170. The Supreme Court recently examined the applicable mens rea for the federal 
statute criminalizing threats of violence.  See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 
(2015).  The statute at issue was silent as to mens rea.  The Court reasoned that negligence 
was insufficient for conviction under the statute, but the Court did not reach the question of 
whether recklessness would suffice or whether instead knowledge or purpose was required.  
Id. at 2017.  In a partial dissent, Justice Alito criticized the majority’s decision not to specify 
the correct mens rea, noting “regrettable consequences” of the Court’s incrementalism.  Id. 
at 2014 (Alito, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“If purpose or knowledge is 
needed and a district court instructs the jury that recklessness suffices, a defendant may be 
wrongly convicted.  On the other hand, if recklessness is enough, . . . a guilty defendant may 
go free.”).  Justice Thomas’s dissent implies that the majority coalition could not agree on 
whether recklessness should suffice where a statute is silent.  See id. at 2028 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“Given the majority’s ostensible concern for protecting innocent actors, one 
would have expected it to announce a clear rule—any clear rule.  Its failure to do so reveals 
the fractured foundation upon which today’s decision rests.”).  In short, the Court couldn’t 
reach consensus concerning whether recklessness sufficed or whether conviction under the 
statute instead required knowledge, a debate that is likely to persist in the coming years as 
lower courts decide which mens rea requirement to impose where federal statutes are silent. 
 171. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 544 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding that 
the Armed Career Criminal Act’s enhanced penalties are triggered by a mens rea of 
knowledge but not recklessness). 
 172. C.f. Simons, Should the Model, supra note 7, at 183 (making a similar proposal on 
different grounds). 
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consider.  In both of these respects, knowledge would be more effectively 
distinguished from recklessness than it currently is.173 
In the end, one’s preference for keeping and clarifying the distinction or 
instead for eliminating it properly depends on a host of normative 
considerations beyond merely the difficulty, and current failure, in 
effectively distinguishing the two concepts. In that vein, a cautionary note 
is in order concerning how to approach the relevant normative 
considerations. 
Some might be tempted to base their preferred solution on whether they 
endorse a competence or instead an error theory as an explanation for the 
findings reported in Part III.  At least, the literature concerning the SEE 
showed such an inclination.  Recall that in the SEE literature, competence 
theorists, who believe that the SEE reveals something about the concept of 
intentionality, of causality, etc., (rather than about the infiltration of bias 
and motivated reasoning), seemed apt to recommend that the law more 
closely track lay-judgments of intentionality and causality.174  In other 
words, competence theorists said, “now that we better understand what 
intentionality is (or what causal responsibility is, or whatever), let’s make 
sure that where the law invokes these concepts, it uses them in accordance 
with what we’ve discovered to be their true meaning.”   
Error theorists, on the other hand, who think that the SEE is evidence of 
motivated reasoning or some other cognitive defect, proposed that law 
ought to seek to eliminate such biases in an effort to maintain the pure 
descriptiveness of concepts like intentionality and causality.175  That is, 
error theorists looked at the data and said, “now that we better understand 
what’s getting in the way of laypeople accurately applying the concept of 
intentionality (or causal responsibility, or whatever), let’s make sure that 
when the law invokes these concepts, it takes pains to prevent laypeople’s 
prejudices from getting in the way of their accurately applying these 
concepts.”   
My cautionary note is that this method of reasoning moves too hastily 
from the descriptive to the normative.176  It focuses too strictly on 
                                                                                                                 
 173. That said, quantifying subjective certainty in this way would have downsides.  For 
example, jurors may have trouble applying probability percentages.   
 174. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 175. See supra notes 77 and accompanying text. 
 176. For this reason, an ultimate conclusion as to whether to keep or discard the 
distinction between knowledge and recklessness is outside the scope of this Article.  But if 
that is so, then why bother discussing the error versus competence theory divide at all?  In 
part, as indicated, simply to head off a problematic means of reasoning through the 
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conceptual analysis—on making sure that the law tracks a given term, 
whatever that term turns out to mean—at the expense of the underlying 
normative considerations that should be driving the analysis.177  In the end, 
whether the ESEE, along with the other findings discussed in Part III, 
reveals something about a given belief state properly understood, or instead 
reveals something about how laypeople misconstrue or misapply that 
belief-state concept, the bottom-line normative issue is whether the 
outcomes in criminal trials—and thus in some sense the law itself—match 
up with the proper aims of criminal law. 
B. A Peculiar Difference Between Willful Ignorance and Knowledge 
What little is left of the distinction between recklessness and knowledge 
has important implications for ongoing debates concerning the relation 
between “willful ignorance” and “knowledge,” and the propriety of 
allowing willful ignorance to satisfy statutory knowledge requirements.  
Willful ignorance has two broad requirements: “(1) the defendant must 
subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) 
the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.”178  
The “deliberate action” may be as minimal as “a cutting off of one’s normal 
curiosity by an effort of will.”179  A paradigmatic example of a willfully 
                                                                                                                 
normative implications of the theories discussed in Part III.  But also because, for those who 
favor maintaining the distinction between knowledge and recklessness, the choice of an error 
or a competence theory may rightly impact the means they propose for clarifying the 
distinction.  By highlighting the merits of a competence theory, this Article seeks to broaden 
the discussion of solutions—which, in similar debates, sometimes assumes an error theory 
and then gestures toward difficult “de-biasing” mechanisms—to include a relatively simple, 
if only partial, solution: altering jury instructions in the hopes that people will follow them. 
 177. To be sure, lay-usage, along with conceptual analysis that tracks it, can be highly 
relevant to a host of important issues (e.g., statutory interpretation, fair notice, crafting 
implementable legal rules, etc.).  My point here is simply that such analysis is less relevant 
to the more fundamental question of what criminal law ought to prohibit in the first place. 
 178. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070 (2011). 
 179. United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1229 (7th Cir. 1990).  The MPC, 
which does not define willful ignorance as separate from knowledge, does not require the 
“deliberate action” prong, and adds a requirement that the defendant not “actually believe[]” 
that the inculpatory proposition is not true.  MPC § 2.02(7).  Some non-MPC instructions 
further require that the defendant’s ignorance was the product of the defendant’s desire to 
escape legal liability.  See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 277 F.3d 1026, 1031-32 (8th Cir. 
2002).   
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ignorant defendant is the drug “mule” who, despite her curiosity, fails to 
check the contents of the briefcase she is paid to transport.180 
Most scholars distinguish willful ignorance from knowledge,181 often 
deeming it a species of recklessness.182  But in doing so, despite purporting 
to track lay-usage or the legal meaning of the concept of knowledge, they 
appeal to supposedly intuitive concepts of knowledge that track neither.183  
Husak and Callender, for example, note (quite plausibly) that “[i]n most 
cases, the (sincere) wilfully ignorant defendant would admit that he 
believes p, but would deny that he knows p.”184  But they then proceed “on 
the assumption that knowledge consists of some kind of externally justified 
true belief,” and reason that “[t]he foremost question in deciding . . . 
whether the willfully ignorant defendant possesses genuine knowledge, is 
whether his belief in the incriminating proposition is justified.”185  In the 
end, they conclude that willful ignorance is distinct from knowledge: 
“Many wilfully ignorant defendants will lack sufficient justification for p, 
and thus will not know p.”186  The problem with this sort of approach is that 
it stresses “justification”—a necessary condition for knowledge under 
traditional philosophical accounts,187 but one that plays little role in 
laypeople’s knowledge ascriptions and appears nowhere in jury 
instructions.188  Much scholarly discussion of willful ignorance—
                                                                                                                 
 180. See, e.g., Husak & Callender, supra note 8, at 37; ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra 
note 14, at 34. 
 181. See, e.g., Charlow, supra note 27, at 1390; Robbins, supra note 8, at 226; Frans J. 
Von Kaenel, Willful Blindness: A Permissible Substitute for Actual Knowledge Under the 
Money Laundering Control Act?, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1189, 1212-13 (1993); Husak & 
Callender, supra note 8, at 51; Jessica A. Kozlov-Davis, A Hybrid Approach to the Use of 
Deliberate Ignorance in Conspiracy Cases, 100 MICH. L. REV. 473, 482-83 (2001); see also 
Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2072 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Willful blindness is not 
knowledge; and judges should not broaden a legislative proscription by analogy.”). 
 182. See, e.g., ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 14, at 34 (“The prototypical willfully 
blind actor is, of course, reckless.”).   
 183. Cf. Garvey, supra note 21, at 370 (“Scholars have offered at least three accounts of 
willful ignorance. These accounts differ because each begins with a different analysis of the 
concept of knowledge.”). 
 184. Husak & Callender, supra note 8, at 46; cf. MPC § 2.02(7) cmt. 9, at 248 
(describing “deliberate ignorance” under the MPC as involving “the case of the actor who is 
aware of the probable existence of a material fact but does not determine whether it exists or 
does not exist”) (emphasis added). 
 185. Husak & Callender, supra note 8, at 46-47. 
 186. Id. at 51. 
 187. See Ichikawa & Steup, supra note 103. 
 188. See Beebe, supra note 155 (providing empirical evidence that, for example, 
laypeople ascribe knowledge to holders of true beliefs that were formed through 
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concerning both whether it is the same as knowledge and, if not, whether it 
is as culpable as knowledge189—is similarly premised on conceptions of 
knowledge that are out of sync with how laypeople understand the term and 
how jury instructions define it.190 
Putting those issues aside, it is still true that willful ignorance can be 
distinguished from knowledge. For example, if the defendant has no belief 
that P, then he does not know that P and can be reckless or willfully 
ignorant with respect to P without knowing that P.191 But if the presence or 
absence of belief were the only difference between knowledge and willful 
ignorance, then the debate over the relative culpability of the two mental 
states would be the same as the debate over the relative culpability of 
knowledge and recklessness.  What else might distinguish willful ignorance 
from knowledge in the typical case, where both mental states involve belief 
in the inculpatory proposition?192   
                                                                                                                 
hallucination, or that study participants themselves judge as going against the evidence of 
which the agent was aware).  Nor is it clear that the question of whether one’s true belief 
was justified should play a role in the relevant culpability determinations. Whereas 
subjective certainty concerning a risk is typically, and rightly, thought to bear on culpability, 
epistemic justification bears on it, if at all, only much more indirectly.  On the culpability 
“grading function” of subjective certainty, see Simons, Statistical Knowledge, supra note 23, 
at 15-16. 
 189. See, e.g., Charlow, supra note 27, at 1417-18; cf. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. 
SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2069 (2011) (“The traditional rationale for this doctrine is that 
defendants who behave in this manner are just as culpable as those who have actual 
knowledge.”). 
 190. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 7-8.  Likewise, in explaining why willful 
ignorance is or is not a form of knowledge, the literature often employs arguments that 
assume normative and pragmatic factors play no proper role in knowledge ascription.  See, 
e.g., ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 14, at 34 (stating as a premise that, “If a similar risk 
imposition would not be deemed ‘knowing’ if undertaken for good reasons . . . then it is 
misguided to deem the risk imposition ‘knowing’ merely because one disapproves of the 
reasons for undertaking it”); Husak & Callender, supra note 8, at 51 (analogizing between 
two instances of awareness with less than full certainty—only one of which is accompanied 
by an easy means of obtaining greater certainty—and assuming that the availability of a 
means of obtaining more certainty is irrelevant to whether the actor’s mental state counts as 
knowledge). 
 191. Of course, that may be relatively rare, at least in close cases, given laypeople’s 
belief-ascription practices—namely, (1) the norm-deviation / belief-ascription heuristic, and 
(2) the numerous degrees and types of belief that can support knowledge ascription.  Cf. 
Husak & Callender, supra note 7, at 42 (“In most cases, the (sincere) wilfully ignorant 
defendant would admit that he believes p”); MPC § 2.02(7) cmt. 9, at 248 (describing 
“deliberate ignorance” under the MPC as involving “the case of the actor who is aware of 
the probable existence of a material fact”) (emphasis added). 
 192. See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
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This Article’s analysis highlights an additional factor distinguishing 
some cases of willful blindness from knowledge: the availability of a 
salient, cheap alternative course of action—e.g., checking inside the 
briefcase—in the case of willful blindness but not in the case of knowledge.  
For example, as discussed above in Part III, the drug mule who feels 60% 
certain there are drugs in the easy-to-open briefcase should not treat as 
settled her belief that “there are drugs in the briefcase” but rather should act 
on her more nuanced belief that “there is a 60% chance there are drugs in 
the briefcase.”193  There is a real practical difference between the two: the 
latter belief dictates that she look inside the briefcase, while the former 
dictates treating the matter as settled and deciding whether to transport 
drugs.194  In other words, the ease with which the prototypical willfully 
ignorant actor could obtain additional information makes that actor’s more 
nuanced probability assessment Actionable while it makes non-Actionable 
her bare belief that P.  Thus, in the rare instances of willful ignorance plus 
belief that P but not knowledge that P, it is often the availability of an easy 
means of obtaining certainty—rather than some difference in the 
defendant’s subjective certainty or epistemic justification—that would 
prevent the defendant’s belief that P from being deemed knowledge that P.  
This distinguishing factor highlights one type of case in which a willful 
ignorance instruction would mean the difference between a finding of 
knowledge and a finding of no knowledge.  It may also help focus the 
inquiry concerning the relative culpability of knowledge and willful 
ignorance.  Ongoing scholarly debate on that topic might fruitfully address 
what it is about having an available means of obtaining certainty that might 
make a defendant more culpable at the same time it makes that defendant’s 
belief less likely to constitute “knowledge.”195 
  
                                                                                                                 
 193. See supra Section III.B.2.a. 
 194. See supra Section III.B.2.a. 
 195. For an account along these lines, see Alex Sarch, Willful Ignorance, Culpability and 
the Criminal Law, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1023, 1080-81 (2014) (suggesting that a “duty of 
reasonable investigation” plays a critical role in those cases in which willful ignorance is as 
culpable as knowledge). 
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C. Implicit, and Outcome-Determinative, Differences in “Belief” and Its 
Relatives 
Now consider the issue of criminal law’s treatment of “belief,” along 
with related belief-state concepts such as “awareness,” “conscious 
disregard,” and “failure to perceive,” which are invoked throughout the 
MPC, the federal code, and jury instructions in both types of jurisdiction.196  
Recall that jury instructions in MPC and federal jurisdictions typically 
invoke these terms without defining them, and that commentators construe 
them as denoting thin, typically dispositional, belief states.197   
The empirical studies surveyed in Part III indicate that when laypeople 
are not told which type of belief state is at issue, they sometimes implicitly 
assume it is thick, as opposed to thin, or occurrent, as opposed to 
dispositional, based on what a given factual scenario or instruction primes 
them to consider.198  When legislatures and courts task juries with ascribing 
a given belief-state concept—“conscious disregard,” “awareness,” “belief,” 
etc.—the very same term, as it is used in the very same statutory provision, 
may be systematically construed as denoting a different type of belief state 
in different cases due to small differences in the factual circumstances 
and/or jury instructions.  This is important because some case outcomes 
hinge on whether jurors implicitly construe legally relevant belief states as 
thick or thin and as dispositional or occurrent.199  
The difference between a finding of belief, awareness, conscious 
disregard, etc., and a finding of no such belief state can be the difference 
between a defendant’s being found reckless and a defendant’s being found 
negligent (or innocent, where negligence is not criminalized).200  But it can 
also be the difference between knowledge and negligence (or between 
knowledge and innocence).  Indeed, where a notion of thick belief or 
occurrent belief is primed, it may actually be easier to show that a 
defendant knew that P than to show that the defendant believed that P: 
laypeople may implicitly think the defendant had a thin, but not a thick 
belief, or had a dispositional, but not occurrent belief, and hence find 
knowledge (which can be found so long as any type of belief is present) 
                                                                                                                 
 196. See supra Part II. 
 197. See supra Part II. 
 198. See supra Section III.B.1.b. 
 199. For examples, see supra Section III.B.1.b. 
 200. See e.g., Husak, supra note 4, at 207-08 (arguing that “the boundary between 
recklessness and negligence is unclear” due to failure to differentiate between occurrent and 
dispositional belief); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 597 (2001). 
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while simultaneously finding no belief (as they understand the concept in 
context).201  While legislators and judges may assume that by implementing 
a knowledge requirement, they are invoking a belief state that will be less 
readily ascribed than “mere” belief, that will not always be the case.  Once 
again, knowledge is in some ways a less stringent and more variant 
requirement than more traditional legal and philosophical accounts would 
have it, in part because the law is not clear about what type of belief must 
underlie it. 
If the status quo is problematic because the “wrong” type of belief is 
sometimes primed,202 what is to be done?  Jury instructions could clarify 
what type of belief is at issue in a given trial, at least where the “wrong” 
type is otherwise likely to be primed.  The statutes on which those 
instructions are based could do likewise.203  Of course, insofar as the 
recommendation is to clarify jury instructions or statutes, a natural next 
question is: What is the “right” kind of belief for criminal law to specify?  
This question once again should not be answered by recourse to an error 
theory or a competence theory and a focus on some singularly “true” 
meaning of “belief,” “awareness,” etc.  Instead, it turns on complex 
normative considerations outside this Article’s scope.204  But by staying 
                                                                                                                 
 201. See supra Section III.B.1.b. 
 202. The status quo may also be problematic on grounds of fair notice, consistency of 
implementation, vagueness and consequent prosecutorial discretion, and other problems 
familiar in contexts where criminal law’s prohibitions are ambiguous.  Cf. J. Kelly Strader, 
(Re)Conceptualizing Insider Trading Law, 80 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1, 4 (2015) (noting that 
vague mens rea elements raise “two basic due process concerns: denying potential 
defendants fair notice and emboldening prosecutors to push the law beyond established 
boundaries”). 
 203. That is, legislatures or code drafters might specify what they mean by the various 
belief state terms they use, at least along the axes of occurrent versus dispositional and thick 
versus thin.  They might do this in the language of the statute itself, or through examples 
found in official commentaries, similar to the “Illustrations” often found in Restatements of 
the Law.  The use of such illustrations, rather than language in the statutory provision itself, 
might prove necessary insofar as the legislature intends for the type of belief at issue to be 
different in different factual circumstances.  In any event, clarification by the legislature 
would help address fair notice and related concerns mentioned supra note 202. 
 204. Of course, that is not to say that there aren’t some readily apparent trade-offs 
involved, whatever conclusion one ultimately draws.  Consider, for example, whether 
awareness should be construed as occurrent or merely dispositional.  A construal of 
awareness as merely dispositional risks undermining the distinction between knowledge and 
recklessness on the one hand and negligence on the other.  But a construal of awareness as 
occurrent might unduly restrict the scope of knowledge and recklessness, and in any event 
gives rise to difficulties in specifying the time at which the defendant must have had the 
occurrent state.  
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silent on the matter, current jury instructions leave the issue up to whatever 
type of belief, awareness, etc., the case happens to have primed.  At the 
very least, the type that is primed is not always the type that commentators 
advocate employing or presume is already being employed in criminal 
cases.205  Moreover, although more research must be done to determine 
more precisely what sorts of instruction wording and factual circumstance 
prime given types of belief, the studies surveyed in Part III evince patterns 
that, even at this early stage, make some instances of unintended priming 
predictable and potentially addressable.206  
D. The Vanishing Distinction Between Description and Judgment 
One broader divergence between mens rea theory and practice warrants 
mention.  An oft-recited piece of conventional wisdom in criminal law 
theory is that “[m]odern criminal law codes . . . tend to make greater use of 
purely ‘descriptive’ criteria, relative to ‘evaluative’ criteria,” in their mens 
rea schemas than did older criminal codes.207  As Alan C. Michaels 
explains, “descriptive” mens rea standards “identify the grounds for liability 
and include those grounds in terms that do not require normative judgment 
                                                                                                                 
 205. See supra Part II.  For example, as a general matter it seems unlikely that judges, 
commentators, or legislators would endorse a thick or occurrent construal of belief, 
awareness, conscious disregard, etc., in any case in which a jury would thereby find that the 
defendant was not reckless (because he lacked the relevant type of belief) but was knowing 
(because he possessed some other type of belief).  See supra notes 101-02 and 
accompanying text (noting the supposed incoherence of a finding of knowledge that P 
without belief that P); supra note 12 and accompanying text (noting the assumption that 
greater culpability attaches to knowledge than to “mere” recklessness). 
 206. See supra Section III.B.1.b.  It is worth stressing that here, as elsewhere in this 
Article, one possible alternative normative response to jury instruction ambiguity would be 
to embrace it.  Perhaps in each case jurors will tend to settle on the meaning of the term at 
issue that, given the specific facts of the case, more closely tracks culpability than would 
more precise mental state categories devised ex ante.  This sort of response, familiar in 
debates over the desirable degree of specificity in criminal law’s prohibitions, runs into the 
problems of fair notice, etc., noted supra note 202.  It is also problematic insofar as the jury 
lacks information about, or ability to tailor, the defendant’s lkely punishment, and is instead 
required to make a binary guilt or innocence decision concerning each charged offense. 
 207. Simons, Understanding the Topography, supra note 42, at 246; see also R.A. Duff 
& Stuart P. Green, Introduction to DEFINING CRIMES 10-16 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green 
eds., 2005) (distinguishing the “descriptivist” from the “moralist” approach); PILLSBURY, 
supra note 42, at 83-85 (contrasting the “allusive style of mens rea” typified by English 
common law but represented as well in the MPC’s conception of recklessness, with the 
“analytic style” of mens rea found in other MPC belief state concepts); GEORGE P. 
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 396-400 (1978). 
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for their application.”208  In contrast, evaluative, or “judgmental,” mens rea 
standards “define criminal liability in plainly indeterminate terms that call 
for appraisals, assessments, or judgments beyond findings of fact.”209  
Within the MPC, for example, recklessness and negligence are thought to 
retain some of the common law’s reliance on evaluation,210 while 
“[p]urpose and knowledge are fully descriptive,” as is the “‘substantial risk’ 
component of the recklessness criterion.”211   
This conventional account of a modern trend toward description and 
away from evaluation is somewhat misleading.  “Knowledge,” for example, 
held up as a paradigmatic example of an objective, value-neutral, and a-
contextual belief state on both legal and philosophical accounts,212 turns out 
instead to be like recklessness: the very same mental events can be 
knowledge or not knowledge depending on the moral valence of the actions 
to which they are relevant and the pragmatic context in which the action 
takes place.  The same may be said for other supposedly non-evaluative 
mental states invoked in current jury instructions.213 
The point here is not that modern mens rea remains evaluative because 
jurors engage in blame-based motivated reasoning that gets in the way of 
their following directions.  Quite to the contrary, the point is that modern 
criminal codes, and jury instructions based on them, do not instruct jurors to 
employ non-evaluative concepts.  Instead, current instructions employ 
concepts like “knowledge,” and descriptions like “high probability” that, on 
                                                                                                                 
 208. Alan C. Michaels, "Rationales" of Criminal Law Then and Now: For a Judgmental 
Descriptivism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 54, 62 (2000).   
 209. Id. at 64. 
 210. See, e.g., PILLSBURY, supra note 42, at 83-85; Simons, Should the Model, supra note 
7, at 199 (“The MPC's current provisions are a mix of descriptive and more evaluative 
criteria.  Purpose and knowledge are fully descriptive” as is “[t]he ‘conscious . . . of a 
substantial risk” component of the recklessness criterion”). 
 211. Simons, Should the Model, supra note 7, at 199; see also Simons, Understanding 
the Topography, supra note 42, at 248 n.51 (arguing that Alexander and Ferzan “greatly 
overstate[] the extent to which evaluative judgments by juries actually affect criminal 
liability,” since “[m]any crimes contain mens rea requirements of knowledge or purpose[,]” 
which are not evaluative concepts) (citing ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 14, at 292).  
Professor Ferzan argues that the availability of affirmative defenses (excuses and 
justifications) insert evaluation into what would otherwise be, in the case of purpose or 
knowledge, for example, a purely descriptive inquiry.  See Ferzan, supra note 42, at 2536, 
2529-30; see also Alexander, supra note 42, at 940; ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 14, 
at 32-33.  In contrast, this Article emphasizes the degree to which evaluation is part of the 
mens rea concepts at issue in the prima facie mens rea requirement. 
 212. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 25, 42, 207.  
 213. See sources cited supra notes 149, 211. 
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their most natural lay-interpretation, turn out to be both descriptive and 
evaluative.214 
E. The Need for Greater Scrutiny of Mens Rea Jury Instructions  
Before concluding, this Article highlights three potential reasons why 
mens rea jury instructions and their interpretation have received relatively 
little attention to date, along with explanations for why each reason is 
misguided.   
First, even if one is convinced that problematic ambiguities lurk within 
mens rea jury instructions, one might still think that careful scrutiny of jury 
instructions is unimportant because jurors are too biased or incompetent to 
respond to changes in jury instructions.  This objection is overblown.  The 
studies reviewed in Part III, along with numerous other social scientific 
studies, show that jury-eligible laypeople’s belief-state ascriptions are 
responsive to small changes in wording, and that their belief-state 
ascriptions are largely constrained by instructions and not simply the 
product of irrational, “blame early”-style motivated reasoning.215  
Moreover, even though irrational bias likely influences mental-state 
ascription to some degree, alteration of misleading jury instructions 
represents a simpler and more immediate reform than the sort of “de-
biasing” efforts sometimes gestured at in the legal literature on criminal law 
and psychology.216  
One might nonetheless suggest a second set of reasons for why scrutiny 
of mens rea jury instructions is not so pressing: perhaps legal institutions 
already ensure reasonably well-functioning and ever-improving jury 
                                                                                                                 
 214. This point is important not only for accurately describing current law, but also for 
determining whether or how to implement various proposals for criminal law reform.  See, 
e.g., Youngjae Lee, Reasonable Doubt and Moral Elements, 105 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2016) (arguing that “the beyond a reasononable doubt 
requirement should not apply to moral or normative elements” of crimes but should continue 
to apply to purely descriptive elements of crimes).     
 215. Of course, criminal trials differ in important respects from social science 
experiments like the ones described in this Article, which, for example, do not involve group 
deliberation. This does not mean, however, that they fail to predict juror behavior.  See 
generally Jonathan J. Koehler & John B. Meixner, Jury Simulation Goals, in THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF JURIES: CURRENT KNOWLEDGE AND A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 
(Margaret Bull Kovera ed., forthcoming 2016).   
 216. See, e.g., Nadelhoffer, supra note 2, at 211-12 (suggesting that “[p]erhaps, if jurors 
were made aware of the various—and seemingly predictable—ways that their judgments can 
be unwittingly affected by evaluative considerations and blame-validation biasing, they 
would be better able to live up to their legal duty to base their decisions solely on the 
material facts of the case,” though noting that such reform would face serious difficulties). 
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instructions without the need for an account of laypeople’s belief-state 
ascription practices.  After all, confused jurors can ask clarifying questions.  
Lawyers can propose alternative instructions if they are concerned that 
jurors’ implicit understanding of belief state terms will hurt their client.  
Appellate judges can correct and refine over time the instructions lower 
courts provide.  More generally, if jury instructions were really giving a 
systematically different impression than judges and commentators thought 
they gave, then the resulting false negatives and false positives in jury 
findings would function as “red flags,” alerting us to the problem.217  
Perhaps the absence of such red flags in the mens rea context means there is 
no problem in the first place. 
Unfortunately, current institutional mechanisms do not warrant such an 
optimistic view.  Jurors might not consciously consider the ways they are 
resolving ambiguities in mental-state descriptions, and they are even less 
likely to note how their resolutions of such ambiguities depart from those of 
legal commentators.218  Lawyers, insofar as they are aware of the sorts of 
subtle ambiguities noted in Part III, are unlikely to successfully propose 
instructions that stray far from typical instructions, and even if they do, the 
resulting instruction will in no way bind, or likely even influence, other 
judges’ instructions.  Moreover, even systematically “inaccurate” mens rea 
ascription will not raise red flags; it is exceedingly difficult to show that a 
jury in any given case got the actus reus finding right but the mens rea 
finding wrong.  Hence no evidence of false positives—no red flags—will 
draw attention to systematically problematic mens rea instructions, even as 
studies of exonerations reveal ways actus reus determinations can go 
systematically awry.  
As for appellate review, it ensures that jury instructions do not misstate 
the law,219 but it does not ensure optimal jury instructions,220 and in fact 
                                                                                                                 
 217. A parallel might be drawn to the way false positive guilty verdicts have led to 
critical examination of pre-trial line-ups and interrogations.  Cf. Robert P. Burns, Some 
Limitations of Experimental Psychologists’ Criticisms of the American Trial, 90 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 899 (2015). 
 218. Nor could jurors likely craft an effective clarifying question, especially given 
judges’ understandable hesitancy to wade into thorny and unsettled legal issues in response 
to a jury’s mid-deliberation questions. 
 219. That said, where counsel fails to lodge an objection to a given instruction, a 
misstatement of the law will only be overturned on appeal if it was not harmless.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Khan, 53 F.3d 507, 516-17 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 220. Indeed, appellate courts sometimes strongly support the use of particular wording in 
jury instructions while nonetheless not overturning convictions based on instructions that 
failed to include it, even without engaging in harmless error analysis.  For example, in 
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further ensures that instructions will remain minimally error-prone and 
hence less than fully explanatory.221  For better or worse, the process of 
jury-instruction creation and review ensures cautious instructions that are 
highly path-dependent—an amalgam of statements that happen to have 
been reviewed and not found erroneous by the relevant appellate court.   
In short, current institutional mechanisms are ill-designed to note and 
remedy problematic mens rea jury instructions, suggesting all the more 
strongly the need for further research in this area.  For now, the upshot of 
the current system of jury-instruction creation and review is to put pressure 
on legislatures.  Their definition of a given mental state must be aimed not 
only at judges but also at jurors, who will often receive minimal-to-no 
guidance beyond the statutory term itself and any statutory definitions.   
A third and final objection to this Article’s focus on jury instructions is 
more theoretical.  Perhaps, in setting out to understand what belief state 
concepts “mean” as they are used in criminal mens rea analysis, this 
Article’s focus on jury instructions and their interpretation is incomplete or 
misleading.  After all, jury instructions can get the law wrong, and even 
those that get the law right can still be misinterpreted, maybe even 
systematically so.  The very possibility of incorrect instructions or mistaken 
interpretation implies that there is some “legal meaning” of these mens rea 
concepts that can differ from what reasonable jurors, faithfully applying 
instructions, would understand these terms to mean.   
This objection highlights an interesting and under-theorized issue: How 
do jurors and jury instructions fit into debates about the content of the law, 
as well as the relation between the content of the law and the 
                                                                                                                 
Jewell, the Ninth Circuit upheld a willful ignorance instruction, stressing the importance of 
the phrase “solely and entirely a result of”—as used in the phrase “[you may convict if his] 
ignorance . . . was solely and entirely the result of . . . a conscious purpose to disregard” the 
possibility that he was transporting narcotics—as a bulwark against a conviction for mere 
recklessness.  United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 704 n.21 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc).  
But, as Judge Sand notes in his influential treatise on federal jury instructions, after Jewell it 
is still “not clear whether this language is ever required, even in the Ninth Circuit,” which 
appears never to have reversed a conviction “for the failure to include it.”  SAND ET AL., 
supra note 50, at 7.  Similarly, in articulating the proper mens rea for aiding and abetting in 
Rosemond, the Supreme Court at times invoked the defendant’s “full knowledge” and “full 
awareness,” but there is no indication that these phrases were meant to, or will, show up in 
future jury instructions concerning aiding and abetting.  See Rosemond v. United States, 134 
S. Ct. 1240, 1248-50 (2014). 
 221. Cf. United States v. Aguilar, 80 F.3d 329, 331 (9th Cir. 1996) (warning that on 
review, the appellate court will “carefully” review any attempt at defining “knowledge,” and 
that “[a]lthough a correct instruction may assist jurors in understanding knowledge,” “[t]he 
district court is not necessarily required to define knowledge”). 
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communicative content of legal texts?222  Delving into that issue would, 
however, take us far afield.  For this Article’s purposes, it is enough to note 
the ways in which mens rea belief state concepts, as they are understood 
and applied by fact-finders in criminal trials, differ from the concepts that 
judges presume are operative, and that scholars use in their descriptive 
accounts and normative proposals concerning mens rea.  Which account of 
mens rea belief-state concepts might more properly be labeled an account 
of the “true legal meaning” of those terms is, for present purposes, beside 
the point. 
V. Conclusion 
This Article began with a simple question: What do legally relevant 
belief states consist of?  Focusing on criminal law, its method of answering 
that question has been to examine jury instructions and jurors’ likely 
interpretation and application of them in the face of circumstantial evidence 
of mental state.223  Drawing on empirical research previously overlooked in 
the legal literature, this Article helps fill a gap in our understanding of 
legally relevant belief states, revealing several important divergences 
between theory and practice. 
As a general matter, belief-state ascription is much more responsive to 
the perceived practical and normative aspects of an agent’s situation than 
has traditionally been assumed.  The amount of evidence one must have in 
order to be taken to have formed a belief that P, and the amount of certainty 
needed to make that belief knowledge, depend on what courses of action 
were available to the agent, as well as how counter-normative the agent’s P-
relevant action was.  Moreover, concepts like belief, awareness, and 
conscious disregard can mean quite different things in different contexts.  
As a result, supposedly legally irrelevant factual differences and slight 
alterations in jury-instruction wording systematically prime jurors to 
                                                                                                                 
 222. Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 479, 479 (2013) (drawing a distinction between “communicative content” and 
“legal content,” arguing that the relationship between the two “varies with context; different 
kinds of legal texts produce different relationships between linguistic meaning and legal 
rules,” and discussing constitutions, statutes, judicial opinions, and contracts, but not jury 
instructions).   
 223. Though outside the scope of this Article, a similar approach has interesting 
implications for other areas of law in which belief state ascription plays an important role, 
such as criminal procedure, torts, contracts, and statutory interpretation. 
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consider occurrent or dispositional and “thick” or “thin” forms of the 
concepts in question, ultimately altering case outcomes. 
As an initial step toward understanding what belief-state terms mean in 
practice, this Article should help clarify what is at stake in, and how best to 
implement, various proposals for mens rea reform.  Its overarching 
implication is that jury instructions deserve closer scrutiny and empirical 
testing than has previously been undertaken.  Growing appreciation for the 
biases that infect the criminal trial process should not blind us to the 
possibility that relatively minor adjustments to jury instructions could 
positively affect outcomes in a multitude of criminal cases, bringing mens 
rea concepts more in line not only with what we have assumed they do 
mean, but also with what we suggest they should mean. 
 
